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EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN THE
CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CLIMATE: THE NEED TO
STRENGTHEN IMPROPRIETY STANDARDS AND REMOVAL
REMEDIES TO INCLUDE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITY HARM
Joshua E. Kastenberg*
In 1964, Richard Hofstadter published “The Paranoid Style in
American Politics” in Harper’s Magazine in which he characterized
the United States’ political life as being immune from the more
egregious effects of class conflict.1 Hofstadter was one of the
twentieth century’s foremost American History scholars, and he
argued that the fact that the United States did not turn to fascism or
communism during the twentieth century’s crisis times stood as a
testament to the nation’s institutional strengths.2 Yet, he also noted
that politics served “as an arena for uncommonly angry minds” and
in turn, this enabled a “small minority” to possess ample political
leverage so that their “animosities and passions” were incorporated
by one of the nation’s two major political parties.3 Using 1964
presidential contender, Senator Barry Goldwater’s supporters as an
example, Hofstadter contended that one of the central characteristics
of the “small minorit[ies]” was their insistence that the nation’s elites
had persecuted them, and whether or not the majority understood
this to be true, they too were the victims of the persecution.4
* Professor Joshua Kastenberg teaches criminal law and criminal procedure at the
University of New Mexico, School of Law. Prior to joining the faculty he served over two
decades in the United States military, and also was a trial judge over a criminal court, where
he adjudicated well-over 200 felony trials.
1 See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in THE PARANOID STYLE
IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (1996) [hereinafter The Paranoid Style].
2 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 325–26 (1989);
David Greenberg, Richard Hofstadter’s Tradition, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1998), https://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/11/richard-hofstadters-tradition/377296/.
3 The Paranoid Style, supra note 1, at 3.
4 See id. at 3, 23–24. See generally Richard Hofstadter, Goldwater and Pseudo-Conservative
Politics, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 1, at
93–141 (exploring Goldwater’s views as compared to other twentieth-century conservatives).
See ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON, ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ: THE 1964 ELECTION 67–69 (2009), for
further explanation of Goldwater’s platform and his follower’s embracement of an anti-
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Although Hofstadter noted that there were “angry” historical
movements across the political spectrum, the modern right wing’s
adherents—as he termed them in 1964—believed themselves
dispossessed, and their country having been taken from them.5
Similar themes were expressed by President Donald Trump in the
2016 presidential campaign.6
Hofstadter wrote in broad themes and he focused on the nation’s
broad political system rather than a component part of it, such as the
population’s relationship to a branch of government.7
His
observations and conclusions remain relevant today, though it is
worthwhile to analyze the effect and relationship of a “small
minority” to a particular branch of government.8 In this regard, there
is question as to whether the fifty state judicial branches are
internally policed to minimize the possibility that modern “right
wing” populism will undermine judicial independence and
impartiality.
Although political scientists will define modern
populism differently,9 for the purpose of this Article, the United
States’ current experience with populism includes sweeping
resentments against minority groups (and in particular immigrants
from non-European regions), political elites, and attacks on longstanding political institutions.10 And, as a caveat to this study,
establishment ideology. Among other aspects of his campaign, Goldwater promised to
withdraw the United States from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union and
argued that the federal government lacked the authority to end segregation. JOHNSON, supra
at 67.
5 The Paranoid Style, supra note 1, at 3, 23. During the early Cold War, to Right Wing
allegations during the Cold War that the Supreme Court had gone soft on communism or
coddled criminals. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
474–75 (2000) (highlighting Nixon’s attack on the Court for being weak on crime); Nadine
Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE
68, 79 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) (discussing the Warren Court being attacked by antiCommunists and being accused of Communist influence).
6 See Mark Mellman, Mellman: The Revolt of the Dispossessed, HILL (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://thehill.com/opinion/mark-mellman/307971-mellman-the-revolt-of-the-dispossessed.
7 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 52 (1970); Richard Hofstadter, The PseudoConservative Revolt—1954, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS,
supra note 1, at 44–45, 49.
8 See Nils Gilman, Revisiting Hofstadter’s Populism, AM. INTEREST (May 2, 2018), https://
www.the-american-interest.com/2018/05/02/revisiting-hofstadters-populism/.
9 See Daniele Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell, Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre,
in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY POPULISM: THE SPECTRE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 1, 3
(Daniele Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell eds., 2008); David Landau, The Limits of
Constitutionalism: Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 524-25 (2018).
10 See MARTIN A. SCHAIN, TRANSATLANTIC COUNCIL ON MIGRATION, SHIFTING TIDES:
RADICAL-RIGHT POPULISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1
(2018); John Batt, American Legal Populism: A Jurisprudential and Historical Narrative,
Including Reflections on Critical Legal Studies, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 651, 760-61 (1995); Conor
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similar concerns would be raised if a modern “left-leaning” populism
had succeeded in national politics.11
The problem of public trust in a fair judiciary is not new. In 1970,
Chief Justice Warren Burger observed, “A sense of confidence in the
courts is essential to maintain the fabric of an ordered liberty for a
free people.”12 While this statement may be nothing more than
aspirational, Burger warned that when “people who have long been
exploited . . . come to believe that courts cannot vindicate their legal
rights from fraud,” an “incalculable damage [is done] to society.”13 It
could be added that “exploitation” includes influencing people to
deflect attention from the actual sources of exploitation to imaginary
or tangential sources, which also may do damage to judicial
institutions.14
A number of state supreme courts have held that judicial service
requires a judge not only to be “learned in the law,” but also to
adjudicate cases or appeals in a fair and impartial manner.15 When
a judge takes an oath of office, he or she accepts a mandate of
performing judicial duties in a conscientious and impartial manner.16
The impartiality requirement is both ancient and embedded in
American jurisprudence.17 The judicial duty of impartiality also
extends to both actual impartiality and the appearance of
Friedersdorf, What Right-Wing Populist Movements Share: Blaming Immigrants, ATLANTIC
(June 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/what-right-wingpopulist-movements-share-blaming-immigrants/532023/.
11 See Tom Ginsburg et al., The Limits of Constitutionalism: The Coming Demise of Liberal
Constitutionalism?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 241 (2018); Cas Mudde, The Problem with Populism,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problempopulism-syriza-podemos-dark-side-europe; see also Joshua Kurlantzick, So You Thought the
Global Populist Wave Was Ebbing? Think Again., WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/16/so-you-thought-the-global-populistwave-was-ebbing-think-again/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bea0859b5352
(explaining
the
possible spread of Populism through democratic elections because of the pushback against the
“mainstream parties”).
12 Chief Justice Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934
(1970).
13 Id.
14 See Elvia R. Arriola, Democracy and Dissent: Challenging the Solomon Amendment as a
Cultural Threat to Academic Freedom and Civil Rights, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 149, 159
(2005); see also In re Abrams, 257 P.3d 167, 174 (Ariz. 2011) (“Nothing threatens public
confidence in the courts and the legal system more than a judge who abuses his power and
exploits the prestige of his office for personal benefit.”).
15 In re Inquiry Concerning Justice Court Judge William E. Bailey, 541 So. 2d 1036, 1039
(Miss. 1989); see, e.g., In re Shilling, 415 N.E.2d 900, 903 (N.Y. 1980).
16 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct 1656, 1666 (2015); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heitzler,
291 N.E.2d 477, 482, 484 (Ohio 1972); In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 557 (Review Tribunal of Tex.
1998).
17 See, e.g., McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 143 (1905); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523,
537 (1869).
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impartiality.18 While the oath of judicial office may appear to be a
simple ministerial act, the current political and cultural climate of
“right-wing” populism has brought forth the possibility that judicial
standards of conduct as embodied in oaths are, in some instances, not
enforceable to a degree that will preserve the impartiality mandate.19
It should not be doubted that the public has an interest in an
impartial judiciary. In 2015, the Supreme Court determined, in
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar that a state can “prohibit judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds.”20 The
compelling interest for Florida was the preservation of public
confidence in an impartial judiciary.21 Florida’s Supreme Court
justices and appellate court judges are appointed by a system of
“merit selection,” but its trial judges are elected by popular vote.22
Florida’s statute preventing trial judges from soliciting campaign
donations was challenged as a First Amendment violation.23 The
majority of the Court noted that while it is difficult to give “precise
definition” to public confidence in the judiciary, public confidence is,
nonetheless, a compelling interest.24 This decision, however, relates
to the financial conduct of judicial candidates.25 Moreover, there is a
tension between Williams-Yulee and the Court’s 2002 decision,
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.26 In White, the Court
determined that judicial campaign speech is constitutionally
protected unless there is a compelling state interest to curtail such
speech.27
White arose from a challenge to Minnesota’s rule
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing positions on matters
likely to come before the courts.28 Both Williams-Yulee and White,
however, narrowly focus on limitations placed on election campaigns
and not on disqualification challenges arising from personal conduct

18 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (quoting Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)); Williams-Yule, 135 S. Ct. at 469 (Harlan, J., concurring); Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 805 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States
v. Hickman, 592 F2d. 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979)).
19 See Sabrina Siddiqui, Kavanaugh’s Angry Testimony Raises Doubts over Future
Impartiality, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/02
/kavanaugh-impartial-justice-testimony.
20 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015).
21 See id. at 1671.
22 See id. at 1662.
23 See id. at 1664.
24 Id. at 1667, 1671.
25 See id. at 1662.
26 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
27 See id. at 774–75, 788.
28 See id. at 768, 776–77.
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once a judge has assumed her or his judicial position.29
This Article focuses on judicial conduct, rather than the narrower
category of campaign speech, though campaign speech may, in many
instances, be thought of as a subset of conduct. It also examines
impropriety standards in a proposed holistic model. This model
should not be interpreted to limit judicial independence in decision
making, but it proposes that state disciplinary commissions and state
supreme courts incorporate procedural justice and community harm
concepts into their investigative and determination processes. Part I
of this Article presents an examination of the current common
frameworks shared by the states for addressing judicial conduct
appealing to popular social and political influences. Included in this
section is an analysis of the interrelationship between implicit bias
and impropriety, as well as on community harm and procedural
justice.
Part II provides both a historical and contemporary analysis of
“populism,” including the effect of populism on the nation’s judiciary.
This section provides an argument for why historic models of
populism provide only minor guidance for addressing the current
wave of populism’s impact on the courts. Namely, not only are there
fundamental ideological differences between the prior populist
movements, ascertaining lessons from the past can easily devolve
into presentism, or put another way, the use of the past to ratify the
present.30 In essence, this section concludes with the admonition that
the phrase “we have experienced this before,” is not a solution to
judicial bias.
Part III then examines the effect of judicial behavior and populism
in three areas of concern. These are: racially derogatory conduct by
judges; demeaning conduct in regard to gender such as sexual
harassment; and, discrimination against gays, lesbians, and
transgendered persons (hereafter LGBT). The Article concludes with
the argument that because judicial behavior, whether on the bench

29 Compare Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662 (“In an effort to preserve public confidence in
the integrity of their judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges and judicial candidates
from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns.”) (emphasis added), with White, 536 U.S.
at 768 (“Since 1974, [Minnesota judges] have been subject to a legal restriction which states
that a ‘candidate for judicial office . . .’ shall not ‘announce his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues.’”) (emphasis added).
30 See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL
THOUGHT 135 (1970). However, according to legal historian and distinguished scholar, G.
Edward White, presentism is inevitable and complete objectivity nearly impossible in the field
of legal history. See G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 818 (2000).
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or off, which is derogatory to persons on the basis of race, national
origin, gender, LGBT status, or other protected classes creates a
community harm which makes fair and impartial trials less likely,
removal sanctions should be more readily accepted.
Concededly, there are crucial considerations in advancing an
argument that the removal or long-term suspension of a judge from
hearing all, or even a class of cases. Judicial removal and suspension
are drastic acts that can have the effect of impeachment without a
formal legislative process.31 That is, the removal or long-term
suspension of a judge negates the intent of the political branches of
government when judges are appointed, or the will of a state’s voters
in terms of elected judges.32 Secondly, freedom of speech is a principle
right of all citizens, and there must be a compelling reason to place
limits on this right.33 Finally, some state constitutions permit
permanent removal, and others only enable temporary suspension.34
This makes the achievement of a national standard difficult.
Although this Article is premised on the theory that judicial
impartiality is a compelling reason, it must be acknowledged that a
majority of the Court in White, did not agree that the reason was
compelling enough to curtail election speech.35 Finally, there is an
underlying principle of judicial ethics that judges have a duty to
adjudicate cases.36
Although this Article concentrates on state judiciaries, it is
important to understand that the federal judiciary is no less impacted
by political and social currents. And, it should also be noted that the
federal judiciary may serve as a barometer of judicial conduct to the
state judiciaries. At present, there are 673 district court judges and

31 See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers
Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1017–18 (2003).
32 See Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n v. Woods, 25 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky. 2000); In re James,
821 N.W.2d 144, 158 (Mich. 2012); In re Roca, 173 A.3d 1176, 1198 (Pa. 2017) (Donohue, J.,
dissenting). But see In re McCree, 845 N.W.2d 458, 474 n.39 (Mich. 2014).
33 See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1067 (1996).
34 Compare In re Roca, 173 A.3d at 1190 (“Against such backdrop it was not unreasonable
for the [Court of Judicial Discipline] to conclude that Appellant’s removal [and permanent bar]
from the bench was an appropriate sanction in light of all of the facts of the case.”), with In re
Watkins, 757 S.E.2d 594, 607 (W. Va. 2013) (affirming the recommendations of the Judicial
Hearing Board’s recommendation to suspend a judge as a result of the judges inappropriate
behavior).
35 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
36 See United States v. Malmsberry, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (citing
United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1005 (10th Cir. 1994); In re American Ready Mix,
Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987));
Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Blackmon, 2001-CA-01911-SCT (¶ 11) (Miss. 2004).
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179 courts of appeals judges as authorized by federal law.37 As of
June 1, 2017, there were fifty-nine women serving as federal court of
appeals judges.38 Additionally, out of the 160 active appellate judges,
twenty-one were African-American, fourteen were Hispanic, and five
were Asian-American.39 “As of June 1, 2017, a total of 194 women
were serving as U.S. district court judges” (representing
approximately one-third of the judiciary).40 There were, in addition,
eighty-one African-American judges, fifty-eight Hispanic judges,
sixteen Asian judges, and one Native American judge.41 After
President Trump’s first ten months in office, when combining the
fourteen confirmations with the fifty-eight pending nominations, his
judicial selections were ninety-one percent Caucasian, and eightyone percent male.42 Given modern American populism’s attack on
elites, coupled with a promise to return to a majoritarian power,
President Trump’s public criticism of a United States District Court
Judge named Gonzalo Curiel, who presided over a lawsuit where he
was a defendant had a conflict of interest as a result the judge’s
Hispanic heritage, is lamentably unsurprising.43
I. ENFORCING JUDICIAL CODES OF CONDUCT AND SAFEGUARDING
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Judicial codes of ethics and enforcement mechanisms which
investigate and recommend sanctions against judges are designed “to
preserve public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

37 See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES: PROFILES OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 1–2 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/R43426.pdf.
38 Id. at 4.
39 Id. at 5.
40 Id. at 15.
41 Id. at 17.
42 See Catharine Lucey & Meghan Hoyer, Trump Choosing White Men as Judges, Highest
Rate in Decades, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://apnews.com/a2c7a89828c747ed9439f60e4a8
9193e; Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Trump’s Judicial Nominations Would Put a
Lot of White Men on the Federal Courts, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/28/this-is-how-trump-is-changing-thefederal-courts/?utm_term=.0808e4aaa6e2.
43 See Z. Byron Wolf,
Read This: How Trump Defended Criticism of Judge for Being
‘Mexican’, CNN (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/politics/donald-trump-gonzal
o-curiel-jake-tapper-transcript/index.html; see also William Galston, The Populist Challenge to
Liberal Democracy, 29 J. DEMOCRACY 1, 11, 12 (2018) (describing populism in modern America);
Mark Champion, The Rise of Populism, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/the-rise-of-populism/2019/01/22/dae2fd80-1e06-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html
?utm_term=.652296e88ad0 (last visited Mar. 5, 2019) (describing the populist trends that can
be seen in President Trump).
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judiciary.”44 As the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged in
2001, “members of the judiciary are held to higher standards of
conduct than members of the public at large and that relatively slight
improprieties [may] subject the judiciary as a whole to public
criticism.”45 The ABA code and its state analogs generally address
the overt acts of judges such as the failure to recuse from an
adjudication in which the judge has a vested interest in the outcome;
public speech and conduct which has the potential to undermine
public confidence in the judiciary; and the unfair treatment of
litigants.46 It does not appear that any of the state enforcement
mechanisms directly address standards for when a judge’s conduct
enforces a community’s implicit bias.47
Implicit bias can be defined as an unconscious mental process that
affects social judgments.48 An individual may believe herself or
himself to be “colorblind,” or equitable in the treatment of others, but
at the same time have their judgment on another person affected by
internal assumptions based on race, gender, age, disability, or
another visibly identifiable trait.49 Usually, a group’s explicit biases
show less than its implicit biases.50 Judges are by no means immune
In re Wilfong, 765 S.E.2d 283, 296 (W. Va. 2014).
In re Going, 761 N.E.2d 585, 589 (N.Y. 2001). Other state high courts have accepted that
judges have to be held to the highest standards of conduct. See, e.g., In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d
865, 881 (Conn. 1997); In re Inquiry Concerning Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271, 276–77, 280 (Iowa
2001). In Flanagan, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that although a judge may
have had a sterling record as a conscientious judge, this did not absolve the judge for
undermining the appearance of impartiality by having an adulterous affair with a subordinate
employee. See id. at 866, 882. In Gerard, a judge was suspended for sixty days because of his
dilatory approach to issuing judicial rulings as well as an improper intimate relationship with
the district attorney. In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 276, 277, 280 (Iowa 2001).
46 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2, 2.2, 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
47 See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 137, 163 (2013).
48 See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions,
4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (2010); John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious
Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV 1, 3
(2010); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law,
58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465, 473 (2010); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law,
3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 429 (2007); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001).
49 See William J. Hall et al., Implicit Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals
and Its Influence on Heath Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Dec.
2015, at e60, e72; see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in
Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464,
1474 (1998) (“The data . . . clearly revealed patterns consistent with the expectation that White
subjects would display an implicit attitude difference between the Black and White racial
categories.”).
50 See Gregory S. Parks, Judicial Recusal: Cognitive Biases and Racial Stereotyping, 18
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 686, 696–97 (2015) (“As measured in the context of race,
44
45
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to implicit bias.51 There is tested evidence that people are generally
able to compensate for their implicit bias when they are aware of it.52
However, it also appears that there must be an acceptance that
certain behaviors minimize the value of individuals based on the
treatment of the individual’s group identity.53 A small number of
state courts have found that the existence of implicit bias requires
new approaches to ensuring fair trials.54
On February 14, 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reaffirmed, in Commonwealth v. Buckley,55 a longstanding principle that a police officer’s judgment in effectuating the
search of a person is an important element to assessing the
lawfulness of the search, but then considered the impact of implicit
bias on policing.56 At first glance, there is little surprise to this
decision. At approximately 10:50 p.m. on January 25, 2013, police
officers conducted surveillance of an apartment building they
suspected of being used for illicit drug activity and then observed the
defendant and another person drive away from the building.57 The
headlights of the defendant’s vehicle had not been turned on in
addition to “traveling above the speed limit,” thereby constituting a
traffic infraction.58 After making the traffic stop the police officer
approached the vehicle and upon smelling marijuana subsequently
asked the defendant if there was marijuana inside the vehicle, as to
which the defendant said that “she did not think so” but that he could
check the vehicle.59 After obtaining consent, the police discovered
cocaine and a firearm.60 The defendant, an African-American male,

whites generally show much more of an explicit preference for whites (40.7% favor) than blacks
(3.4% favor), especially when compared to other racial groups. More than half of whites (56.0%)
show no preference for either group. At the implicit level, however, whites show a robust
preference for whites (71.5% favor) over blacks (6.8% favor), with only 21.7% showing no
preference. In fact, whites express more in-group favoritism on implicit measures (78.4%) than
on explicit measures (51.1%).”).
51 See id. at 696; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1208, 1232 (2009).
52 Id. at 1202–03.
53 See id.
54 See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 6 (2012), http://www.national-consortium.org/~
/media/Microsites/Files/National%20Consortium/Implicit%20Bias/Helping-Courts-AddressImplicit-Bias.ashx; see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 51, at 1226 (explaining methods to
combat implicit biases in the criminal justice system).
55 Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 N.E.3d 767 (Mass. 2018).
56 See id. at 770, 776, 777.
57 Id. at 770.
58 See id. at 770–71.
59 Id. at 771.
60 Id.

EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

1504

Albany Law Review

9/17/19 5:03 PM

[Vol. 82.4

later challenged the voluntariness of his consent to search his vehicle
but did not claim that he was racially profiled by the police.61 The
state justices, however, recognized that there is both an explicit and
implicit problem throughout the legal system which serves to deny
minorities the same legal equality as the majoritarian population.62
Justice Kimberly S. Budd, in her concurrence, went further than the
majority in noting that law enforcement decisions affected by implicit
bias, even when made in good faith, stigmatize members of the
minority population.63
Two years earlier in Commonwealth v. Warren,64 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that consciousness of
guilt evidence—including a person fleeing the police—should be
given little weight as a determining factor of reasonable suspicion.65
The justices relied on a study conducted by the Boston Police
Department which found a pattern of racial profiling by police in the
city and thus, “suggests a reason for flight unrelated to the
consciousness of guilt . . . [including] the desire to avoid the recurring
indignity of being racially profiled . . . .”66 While the state’s highest
court did not discuss implicit bias, it is clear that the justices were
concerned that juries would be less likely to believe that innocent
people would flee from police than fairness required.67 In 2018, one
justice, in a concurrence, recognized that implicit bias has the
potential to undermine the right to a fair trial at all stages of a
criminal trial.68 A Massachusetts court rule now places on judges the
duty to maximize the opportunity in voir dire to discover implicit
bias.69
In 2013 the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Saintcalle,70
determined that jury service “is a ground level exercise of democratic
values.”71
Saintcalle arose from a trial judge’s overruling a
Id. at 772, 776–77.
See id. at 777.
63 See id. at 781 (Budd, J., concurring) (citing Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 833 N.E.2d 590,
604 (Mass. 2005) (Greaney, J., concurring)).
64 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016).
65 Id. at 341-42.
66 See id. at 342.
The court held that based on the recent findings of a Boston Police
Department report documenting a racial profiling pattern, courts should be reticent to accord
too much weight to a minority member who flees from the police. See id.
67 See id.
68 See Buckley, 90 N.E.3d at 781–83 (Budd, J., concurring) (noting that there is a
presumption, which the defendant must overcome, that a traffic stop was not based on an
indefensible standard).
69 See MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 6.
70 State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326 (Wash. 2013).
71 Id. at 337. One of the important features about Saintcalle, was that the Court pointed
61
62
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defendant’s objection to a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against
the sole African-American juror in a criminal trial.72 The state
supreme court concluded that the “systematic removal” of minority
jurors not only “cheap[ens] the value of the jury verdict,” it also
creates “a badge of inferiority” on the state’s minority members.73 In
other decisions, the Washington Supreme Court determined that
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel are susceptible to implicit
bias.74 Thus, the Washington Supreme Court has extended its bias
analysis to community harm without naming it as such, which, if
permitted to continue, has the possibility of eroding fairness in all
legal functions.
A. Judicial Authority and Implicit Bias: Creating a Community
Harm
Judges hold a position of trust that is different from officials in the
state and federal legislative and executive branches.75 Justice John
Paul Stevens, in his White dissent, pointed out that this position of
trust remains the same whether a judge is appointed or elected.76 In
Mistretta v. United States,77 the Court held that the judiciary’s
legitimacy depends on its impartiality.78 Because of the judiciary’s
unique status, a judge’s explicit bias may contribute to a jury’s
implicit bias, if not that of a community.79 A judge who evidences a
dislike or articulates a disparagement against a particularized group
of individuals places his or her impartiality into doubt.80 But this
out that not once since Batson had it overturned a conviction based on the peremptory
challenge. Id. at 335.
72 Id. at 329.
73 Id. at 337.
74 See State v. Walker, 341 P.3d 976, 991 n.13 (Wash. 2015); see also State v. Jefferson, 429
P.3d 467, 480 (Wash. 2018) (“[T]hese proffered, racially neutral reasons for striking Juror 10
seem to lack support in the record. They reflect differential treatment [by the prosecutor] of
the sole African American juror, and hence, they ‘could’ support an inference of implicit bias.”);
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 635 (Wash. 2018) (“Given the evidence before this court and out
judicial notice of implicit and overt racial bias against black defendants in this state, we are
confident that the association between race and the death penalty is not attributed to random
chance.”); In re Marriage of Black, 392 P.3d 1041, 1052 (Wash. 2017) (“Given the facts of this
case, the trial court’s improper consideration of Rachelle’s sexual orientation was intertwined
with an implicit preference for Charles’ religious beliefs.”).
75 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
77 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
78 Id. at 407.
79 Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L. REV.
243, 282 (2000); see Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit
Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 842–43 (2012).
80 See Neitz, supra note 47, at 143–44.
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conduct can also harm the community by creating an environment in
which the public normalizes prejudicial behavior.81
The right of confrontation presents one contextual model for
assessing judicial conduct and community bias. In criminal trials,
the right of confrontation is essential for a defendant to uncover a
witness’ bias or motivations to testify in less than truthful manner,
as well as uncover a witness’ faulty memory.82 In civil trials,
although not a Sixth Amendment right, confrontation is nonetheless
essential to ensure a fair trial because it permits counsel to uncover
similar biases and motives of witnesses, as well as a witness’ memory
lapses.83 In situations in which a judge has evidenced overt bias or
lack of respect against an identifiable group and then limits crossexamination through the application of relevancy rules, the judge
may cause the result of his or her trials to be suspect, even in
instances where the limits are defensible.84
While the Washington and Massachusetts appellate judiciary
appears to have taken a lead in considering the effect of implicit bias
on the whole trial,85 there are a small number of other state appellate
courts that have accepted that implicit bias may affect trials.86 In
2012, an Ohio Court of Appeals judge, in a concurring opinion, urged
that because trial judges were no more immune from implicit bias
than the community at large, disparities in sentencing constituted a
basis for appeals.87 In 2017, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that
implicit bias exists in juries and that state’s trial courts should be
proactive in protecting defendants from the dangers of such bias.88
There is, however, a critical caveat which must be recognized in
examining the relationship between the judiciary and a community’s
See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2018).
See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 693 (1931) (citing Tla-Koo-Yel-Lee v.
United States, 167 U.S. 274, 277 (1897); Farkas v. United States, 2 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir.
1924); King v. United States, 112 F. 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1902); People v. Moore, 89 N.Y.S. 83
(N.Y. App. Div. 1904)).
83 See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014).
84 See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008) (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 228 (1985)); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that a
prosecutor violates the Equal Protection Clause when minority members are excluded without
justification through the peremptory challenge process). In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court extended Batson to civil trials. See id. at 631 (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 96-97). In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), the Court further extended
Batson to prohibit a defense counsel in a criminal trial from excluding prospective jurors on the
basis of race. See id. at 59.
85 See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 329, 335 (Wash. 2013); MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 6.
86 See State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 816, 817 (Iowa 2017); In re Gremillion, 2016-0054, p.
27–28 (La. 6/29/16); 204 So. 3d 183, 199.
87 See State v. Sherman, 2012-Ohio-3958, at ¶¶ 45, 49 (Stewart, J., concurring).
88 See Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 817.
81
82
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implicit biases and the adoption of a community harm model.
Although there is a recognition that implicit bias exists, it would be
unconscionable to adopt a scheme which enables recusals based on a
judge’s race, religion, national origin, gender, or other protected class.
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined, in
United States v. Alabama,89 that the race of a judge coupled with the
judge’s prior work as a civil rights attorney did not constitute a basis
for requiring recusal.90 Three years earlier, in a minority-based classaction suit against the city of Houston, Texas, the city attorney
motioned an African-American federal judge, Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald to recuse herself from the case on the basis of her race and
that she had lived in Houston.91
The lawsuit arose as a challenge to Houston’s voting scheme and
while it was true that Judge McDonald shared the same race as the
plaintiff class, she noted–in charitable terms–that a grant of recusal
would be a disservice to the law.92 Although Judge McDonald was
undoubtedly correct in her decision, President Trump’s aspersion
against Judge Curiel suggests that there remains a strongly-held
belief that a judge’s decisional processes are fundamentally defined
by their race, gender, national origin, or other genetic features.93
Judge McDonald’s refusal to recuse in this instance serves as a
reminder that adherence to the principle of dedication to the law and
the refusal to countenance prejudice in a courtroom are both critical
to the long-term faith in an impartial judiciary.94
B. Canon-Based Regulation of Judicial Conduct
The American Bar Association’s 2010 Canons of Judicial Ethics, as
in the case of its 1924, 1972, 1990, and 2007 predecessors, were

United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987).
See id. at 1542-43 (“The fact that an individual belongs to a minority does not render one
biased or prejudiced, or raise doubts about one’s impartiality: ‘that one is black does not mean,
ipso facto, that he is anti-white; no more than being Jewish implies being anti-Catholic, or being
Catholic implies being anti-Protestant.’”).
91 See Le Roy v. Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415, 424 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
92 Id. at 416, 420.
93 See Z. Byron Wolf, Trump’s Attacks on Judge Curiel Are Still Jarring to Read, CNN (Feb.
27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/judge-curiel-trump-border-wall/index.html;
see also Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Status, and
Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1996)
(“The judge’s life experience and personal characteristics such as race, gender, sexual
orientation, and socioeconomic status, inevitably and naturally influence the decision making
process.”).
94 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
89
90
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issued to guide ethical judicial behavior.95 While the ABA code is not
enforceable in most state courts, each of the fifty states possess a
judicial code of conduct which mirror, in varying degrees, the ABA’s
model codes.96 Moreover, each state judiciary possesses a judicial
investigatory mechanism which operates as an administrative
agency.97 Most state agencies are authorized to issue advisory
opinions as to whether a certain type of conduct may undermine
judicial impartiality or judicial independence.98 Likewise, state
supreme courts are empowered with rule-making authority which
can also guide judicial behavior.99
The first canon of the 2010 ABA Code mandates that judges “shall
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary.”100 This canon includes three rules which instruct
judges to comply with the law, promote confidence in the judiciary,
and restrain from actions constituting an abuse of judicial office.101
The code’s second canon mandates that judges have to perform their
duties with fairness and impartiality and without bias, prejudice, or
harassment.102 Included in this ruleset is an admonition that judicial
duties include upholding and applying the law.103
On a state by state basis, there are differences in the degree to
which judges may be disciplined for engaging in conduct which
undermines public confidence in the judiciary. For instance, the
Wisconsin Constitution permits the permanent removal of a judge for
cause without legislative involvement.104
Yet, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has made it clear that, short of a formal
impeachment, only it, and not an executive branch agency, even with
delegated authority from the legislature can remove a judge.105 In
Texas, the state judicial commission may censure a judge after a
formal proceeding, but it can only recommend removal to the state’s

See id. at Preamble.
See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03 (5th ed.
2013); James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election
Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671, 673 (1989).
97 See Alfini & Brooks, supra note 96, at 680.
98 See GEYH ET AL., supra note 96, at § 1.13; Mel A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory
Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 101, 102 (2001).
99 See GEYH ET AL., supra note 96, at § 6.07.
100 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
101 See id. r. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3.
102 Id. r. 2.2, 2.3.
103 Id. r. 2.2.
104 See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
105 See Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶ 36, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 174, 897
N.W.2d 384, 397.
95
96

EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

2018/2019]

Evaluating Judicial Standards of Conduct

9/17/19 5:03 PM

1509

highest court.106 Moreover, the Texas judiciary has developed a
jurisprudence that a reprimand is assumed to have caused a judge to
change his or her behavior, and therefore should not ordinarily serve
as the basis for recusal, thereby giving the judge a clean slate.107
Minnesota’s disciplinary process is structured similarly to Texas.108
The California Commission on Judicial Performance may censure,
admonish, or remove a judge, but the commission’s determinations
are subject to appeal to the state supreme court.109 The Arizona
Supreme Court is authorized to censure, suspend without pay, or
permanently remove a judge on a recommendation from the state
commission on judicial conduct.110 In West Virginia, a judge may only
be permanently removed through legislative impeachment.111 The
purpose of noting the distinctions between the state judicial
disciplinary methods is that these distinctions will constitute one
element to contextualize how the state supreme courts address
allegations that judges have acted in a discriminatory manner.
C. Safeguards of Judicial Authority
In spite of the possibility that judges may be suspended or removed
from office, a judge enjoys unique safeguards not found elsewhere.112
Judges are generally immune from civil liability for actions arising
out of judicial service.113 For instance, a judge who enables a medical
sterilization procedure on a person without the person’s knowledge is
immune from civil suit.114 And, a judge who finds a defendant guilty
or sentences a defendant based on discriminatory police actions or a
discriminatory state law cannot be sued.115 As the Supreme Court
See, e.g., In re Keller, 357 S.W.2d 413, 429 (Tex. 2010).
See, e.g., In re Welsh, No. 09-15-00498-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9325, at *11–12 (Tex.
App Aug. 25, 2016) (citing In re Lewis, 495 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Tex. App. 2016)).
108 See MINN. R. BD. ON JUD. STANDARDS r. 11.
109 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18. For an explanation as to what constitutes willful misconduct,
see Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Cal. 1995). In that decision
the state court found that there were three elements to willful (judicial) misconduct: “1)
‘unjudicial conduct,’ 2) ‘committed in bad faith,’ 3) ‘by a judge acting in his judicial capacity.’”
Id. at 1266 (quoting Spruance v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221 (Cal.
1975)).
110 ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, § 4.
111 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
112 See GEYH ET AL., supra note 96, at § 13.01.
113 See id.
114 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
115 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549–50, 553–54 (1967) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991) (quoting Stump,
435 U.S. at 362 (1978) (holding a judge immune from suit for directing police to use excessive
force in carrying out his judicial order).
106
107
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noted in Dennis v. Sparks,116 judicial immunity against civil suits
may extend to allegations that a judge has corruptly decided an issue,
because there is a greater principle of having judges at “liberty to
exercise their independent judgment about the merits of a case.”117
A judge may, of course, be found guilty of violating the civil rights
of a defendant if the judge knowingly acts contrary to law with the
specific intent of depriving a citizen of his or her rights.118 However,
this Reconstruction-era doctrine, which arose from a federal
indictment of a state judge,119 has seldom been tested and subsequent
courts have cast doubts on expanding the doctrine beyond the ability
of the federal government to criminally prosecute a judge.120 At
present, this doctrine has not been applied to judicial speech.121
Moreover, there are other safeguards to judicial speech. In In re
Kendall, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that unless
a trial judge’s statements constituted an immediate danger to the
administration of justice, courts of appeal could not employ their
inherent contempt authority against the offending judge.122 Kendall,
arose from a Virgin Islands trial judge who referred to a mandamus
order from Virgin Island Supreme Court as proof that the justices
had committed “gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of
committing illegal acts.”123 The Third Circuit recognized the value of
promoting respect for the judiciary and that the trial judge had
“gratuitously undermined” this value, but the use of contempt was
not a proper means of discipline.124
In spite of the probability that overt acts against specific social
groups can contribute to a community’s implicit bias, judges have, in
addition to other protections, a de facto safeguard against having to
defend against their actions.125 Breaches of the codes of judicial
conduct are not ordinarily a basis for a litigant’s claims of partiality,
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
Id. at 26, 31 (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Bradley, 80 U.S. at 349-50).
118 See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46, 348–49 (1880).
119 See id. at 340.
120 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624, 626 (2000); Francis v. Lyman, 108
F. Supp. 884, 887, 888 (D. Mass. 1952). But see Picking v. Pa. R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240, 250-51
(3d Cir. 1945) (finding that Congress in the passage of the Civil Rights Act effectively negated
this judicial immunity for discrimination claims).
121 See, e.g., In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 816 (3d Cir. 2013).
122 See id. at 816, 826.
123 Id. at 829.
124 Id. at 833.
125 See John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts-Democratic Values and Judicial
Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 193, 229 (1994); Amy Wolf-Vanderbilt, Implicit Bias
Shapes Our Views Without Us Knowing It, FUTURITY (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.futurity.org
/implicit-bias-1261282-2/.
116
117
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discrimination, or favoritism.126 Instead, judicial codes of conduct are
designed to inform judges on standards of behavior required to
ensure that the public has confidence in the judiciary’s impartial
administration of justice.127 Likewise, the discipline of an errant
judge is only a determination that the judge has undermined
confidence in the judiciary.128
For instance, a judge who
“brandish[es]” a sexual toy at a public defender and later “refer[s] to
this incident twice in open court so as to curtail the victim’s crossexamination of two witnesses,” can be disciplined for devaluing the
witness’ dignity, even though the verdict in that particular case
remains intact.129 A judge who visits a legal brothel in Nevada and
boasts about it in his home state, which prohibits prostitution, may
be censured, but his past rulings in criminal trials arising from
“public morals charges” will remain in effect.130 Likewise, a judge
who casts an aspersion against a child victim of a sexual assault may
be suspended without pay, but the suspension does not translate into
a retrial.131 And a judge who sexually harasses court personnel
outside of a courtroom may also be found to have undermined the
integrity of the judicial branch, though his determinations in sexual
harassment cases may be upheld.132
To be sure, there are instances in which a judge’s poor behavior
results in overturning a verdict, but invariably the behavior occurs
while the judge adjudicates an issue as part of a bench trial.133 In
1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a judge who
injected his personal religious beliefs into an adjudication failed to
uphold the principle of an impartial judiciary.134 In that case, a
father who had remarried sued his former spouse for visitation rights
to his children.135 The former spouse testified that she did not object
to the father’s visitation, but claimed the children refused to see their
See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1255, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2000); In re Gorby,
339 S.E.2d 702, 703 (W. Va. 1985).
128 See In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 869 (Me. 1981); In re Nowell, 237 S.E.2d 246, 257 (N.C.
1977); Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286,
at ¶ 33 (citing Kloepfer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 782 P.2d 239, 262 (Ca. 1989)).
129 See, e.g., Geiler v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 515 P.2d 1, 5, 9–10, 11 (Ca. 1973).
130 See In re Tschirhart, 371 N.W.2d 850, 851, 853 (Mich. 1985).
131 See Judicial Standards Comm’n of Mont. v. Baugh, 2014 MT 149, ¶¶ 8–11, 13, 375 Mont.
257, 334 P.3d 352 (citing State v. Rambold, 2014 MT 116., ¶¶ 22–23, 375 Mont. 30, 325 P.3d
686).
132 See, In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 851, 858–59 (Minn. 1988); In re Seraphim, 294 N.W.2d
485, 494–95, 501 (Wis. 1980).
133 See, e.g., In re J.A., 601 A.2d 69, 72, 76–77, 79 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam).
134 See In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 10, 11 (N.J. 1985).
135 Id. at 10.
126
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father after he remarried.136 The judge instructed the former spouse
that even though the father was a “100 carat cad,” she had “an
absolute affirmative duty cast upon [her] by [her] God, [not the
judge], but by God,” to influence her children to change their
minds.137 In this case, the judge’s ruling was overturned and
remanded for a new hearing.138 Finally, although in theory, a bar
association can discipline a judge since a judge is also an attorney,
there is resistance to this because it would enable a professional
association to usurp a formalized administrative or judicial means for
removal.139 In 1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, determined that the
state’s Judicial Inquiry and Review Board possessed exclusive
constitutional jurisdiction to discipline judges.140 In 1988, eight state
judges were removed from office after receiving gifts of money from a
labor union.141 At the same time the administrative board sought to
discipline the eight judges, the state board of professional
responsibility determined that the judges violated canons of legal
ethics, and pursued disciplinary proceedings.142 Pennsylvania’s
supreme court recognized that the eight judges may have violated
various canons of legal ethics, but then determined that any lawyer
disciplinary actions would have to be abated until the Judicial
Inquiry and Disciplinary Review Board had completed its
investigation and any judicial avenues of redress were finalized.143
Pennsylvania is not alone in this construct. In In re Troisi,144 the
West Virginia Supreme Court determined that the state’s lawyer
disciplinary proceedings could not take action against a judge who
assaulted a litigant party until the judge was removed from the bench
through the state’s formal judicial discipline processes.145
D. Community Harm and Procedural Justice
When the overt conduct of a judge strengthens a community’s

See id.
Id.
138 See id. at 11.
139 See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, 595 A.2d 42, 43, 49 (Pa.
1991); Andrew E. Brashier, Comment, Ex Parte Alabama State Bar: Who Has Jurisdiction
When Judges Act Unethically as Lawyers?, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 187, 189, 198, 201 (2009).
140 See Anonymous Attorney A, 595 A.2d at 49.
141 See id. at 43, 44.
142 See id. at 43.
143 See id. at 49.
144 In re Troisi, 504 S.E.2d 625 (1998).
145 See id. at 634.
136
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implicit biases, the judge, either by design or accident, potentially
creates community harm by not only shaping the unconscious
attitudes of jury pools and witnesses, but also by undermining the
principle of equal treatment for all litigants who may come to accept
that judicial favoritism is an unfortunate permanent feature of the
judicial system.146 Concerns over judicial impartiality are not new.
In Tumey v. Ohio,147 the Supreme Court determined the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed the right to an impartial judge.148 While
Tumey established a rule prohibiting state judicial officers from
serving on trials in which they had a pecuniary interest in the
outcome, it also noted that there were other areas of concern, such as
family relations between the bench and bar.149 Although the explicit
conduct of judges falls into a different category than pecuniary
interest, both have the possibility of eroding the public’s perception
of the courts.150 In this respect, the notion of community harm has
antecedent roots.
In addition to explicit judicial conduct reinforcing a community’s
implicit biases, another means for understanding community harm
is to use concepts of procedural justice. Procedural justice may be
defined by assessing whether litigants, witnesses, or the general
public believe that the courts are fair and judicial rulings
legitimate.151 When the general public experiences procedural
justice, the public perceives the judicial system as legitimate.152
Studies on procedural justice have concluded that even in instances
where a majority’s beliefs do not prevail in court, the overall
impression of the judiciary does not erode if there is a widespread
belief that the judicial body that issued its decision evidenced its
impartiality.153 Despite judicial elections in some states, procedural

146 See, e.g., James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where
Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775, 781, 785, 788 (2004).
147 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
148 See id. at 523; see also Joshua E. Kastenberg, Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s
Conception of Judicial Integrity: The Legal History of Tumey v. Ohio, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV 317,
320–21, 366 (2016) (providing an exposition of the Court’s motivations to expand the federal
right to the states).
149 See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 280 (1884)).
150 See Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St. 3d 2004, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d
286, at ¶ 33 (citing Kloepfer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 782 P.2d 239, 262 (Ca. 1989));
Kastenberg, supra note 148, at 320.
151 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 128–29 (2011); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts,
44 CT. REV. 26, 28 (2007).
152 See Victor D. Quintanilla & Michael A. Yontz, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design:
Procedural Justice and Process Value Pluralism, 54 TULSA L. REV. 114, 115 (2018).
153 See Kristina Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice
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justice is not a solely majoritarian province.154
Failures in obtaining procedural justice may result in classes of
citizens deciding not to take part in trials and other judicial functions
such as public hearings.155 A recent study indicates that people
believe when judges adhere to the rules governing their duties as
embodied in the canons of judicial ethics and the plain language of
judicial oaths, they will be more likely to participate in the judicial
processes such as showing up for jury duty.156 When people believe
that the courts are unfair, they will be less likely to participate in
judicial processes, or participate, and also resort to measures such as
jury nullification.157
The Court recently gave the concept of procedural justice support
in Rosales-Mireles v. United States.158 Decided on June 18, 2018, the
Court determined that appellants erroneously convicted under the
sentencing guidelines may raise for the first time a challenge to the
sentence in a court of appeals, and the court of appeals must, when
the sentencing miscalculation affects an appellant’s substantial
rights, exercise its discretion and vacate the sentence.159 In writing
for the majority opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited to the concept
of procedural justice in noting that “regardless of its ultimate
reasonableness, a sentence that lacks reliability because of unjust
procedures may well undermine public perception of the
Effective When People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2009);
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANNU. REV.
PSYCHOL. 375, 379–80 (2006); Quintanilla & Yontz, supra note 152, at 115.
154 See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and
to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 992 (2000); see also STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL.,
A FAIR HEARING?: ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 26 (2005) (“Obviously, one
would expect those acquitted to have a more favourable view of the fairness of the outcome,
although not necessarily the fairness of the procedures.”).
155 See Thomas Baker et al., Shared Race/Ethnicity, Court Procedural Justice, and SelfRegulating Beliefs: A Study of Female Offenders, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 433, 437 (2015).
156 See Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal
Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, &
L. 78, 81 (2014) (“When officers wield their power in fair and just ways, this imbues them with
a sense of appropriate normative purpose and values in the eyes of citizens, in turn
strengthening the willingness of citizens to cooperate with legal authorities.”).
157 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (2011);
Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV 389, 398 (2004).
158 Rosales-Mireles v. United States 138 S. Ct 1897, 1903 (2018). The appeal in this case
challenged the permissive nature of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See id. at 1903.
This rule states, “A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though
it was not brought to the court’s attention.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
159 See Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct at 1903. The petitioner in this case argued that although
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) was written as a permissive rule, the application of
the rule by the courts of appeal should be mandatory when a defendant’s substantial rights in
sentencing were negatively affected, even when the appellant did not raise an objection to the
district court. See id. at 1903, 1905.
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proceedings.”160
In addition to the Court, a limited number of appellate courts have
recognized the validity of procedural justice. In 2015, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Bigly161
determined that the district courts were obligated to consider nonfrivolous mitigation evidence even if disfavored by the federal
sentencing guidelines.162
Judge Janice Rodgers Brown in a
concurrence determined that procedural justice is attained when a
court responds to a defendant’s arguments.163 This is because, in
doing so, the court “communicates a message of respect for
defendants, strengthening what social psychologists call ‘procedural
justice effects,’ thereby advancing fundamental purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act.”164 In 2014, the Kentucky Supreme Court
upheld a state ethics rule which found that where the prosecution
insisted on a defendant waiving the right to raise appeals based on
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in order to obtain a plea
agreement, the prosecution’s demand undermined the concept of
procedural justice.165 The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision not
only highlights the importance of procedural justice in criminal
trials, but it also connected a rule of ethics as being important to
establishing procedural justice.166
Courts have also accepted the existence of a desired procedural
justice goal in civil matters. In Caban v. Jr. Seafood,167 the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico concluded, as a
matter of procedural justice, that federal courts should be reticent to
intrude into state (or in this case commonwealth) trials unless
absolutely necessary, because the federal courts risk the population’s
confidence in local trials.168 In 2016, Justice Michael B. Hyman on

160 Id. at 1910. It should be noted that the dissent in this opinion, as written by Justice
Thomas, with Justice Alito joining, cast significant doubts on the application of procedural
justice to federal criminal courts. See id. at 1914–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161 United States v. Bigly, 786 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
162 Id. at 15 (citing In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
163 Bigley, 786 F.3d at 17 (Brown, J., concurring).
164 Id.
165 See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 140, 157–58 (Ky. 2014). In this
decision, the United States Attorney challenged a state ethics rule claiming that the state rule
usurped federal criminal practice. See id. at 141–42. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court
determined that it had a duty to regulate the legal profession within the state’s borders. See
id. at 157–58. In 2015, in Sanders v. State, 773 S.E.2d 580 (2015), the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning underlying Kentucky Bar Association. See Sanders, 773 S.E.2d at
582 n.2.
166 See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 157.
167 Caban v. Jr. Seafood, 132 F. Supp. 3d 274 (D.P.R. 2015).
168 See id. at 284 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 40 F.3d
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the Illinois Appellate Court noted that procedural justice and
fairness are not limited to outcomes of civil trials, but rather should
be assessed by a judge’s courtroom management and the effectiveness
of attorneys.169 The Illinois Appellate Court reviewed a pro-se
appellant’s assertion that she was not well represented in her
personal injury lawsuit against the Chicago Transit Authority, and
the Transit Authority’s attorney openly disobeyed the judge’s orders
without being admonished by the judge.170 Justice Hyman cautioned
the court of appeals that it was critical, as a matter of public
confidence in the judiciary, to explain to a pro se litigant why the
appellate court determined she did not state a basis for appeal in her
brief rather than dismiss the appeal outright.171
There are limits to courts accepting a role for procedural justice in
judicial determinations. In United States v. Colon,172 Judge Jeffrey
Meyer on the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut accepted that government agents had engaged in
“manipulative, sneaky, and deceitful investigative methods,” but had
not violated the defendants’ due process rights.173 In Colon,
government agents had created the means for the defendants’
attempted commission of an armed robbery.174 The defendants
conceded that the government’s conduct did not constitute
entrapment, but was nonetheless unconstitutionally outrageous, and
in the alternative, the government had undermined the concept of
procedural justice.175
Judge Meyer accepted the existence of
procedural justice as a means for assessing the efficacy of criminal
justice in the United States but noted that neither the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court had found
procedural justice as a basis for quashing indictments, suppressing
evidence, or overturning convictions.176
Although the Supreme Court has only recently accepted the
importance of procedural justice,177 and although only the Kentucky
Supreme Court has considered procedural justice as a means to

18, 24 (1st Cir. 1994)).
169 See Wing v. Chi. Transit Auth., 2016 IL (1st) 153517, ¶ 22 (Hyman, J., concurring).
170 See id. at ¶¶ 20, 22.
171 See id. at ¶ 24.
172 United States v. Colon, 71 F. Supp. 3d 269 (D. Conn. 2014).
173 Id. at 275.
174 See id. at 273.
175 See id. at 271, 282.
176 See id. at 282.
177 See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1910 (2018).
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gauge attorney ethics,178 there is a logical nexus between society’s
view in the integrity of an impartial judiciary which treats all classes
of citizens with equal respect, and society’s willingness to take part
in its jurisdiction’s judicial functions in a fair and open-minded
manner.179
II. HISTORIC MODELS OF POPULISM AND THE RULES OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS: THE PAST IS NOT PROLOGUE
The United States possesses a history of political and social
movements which coalesced around beliefs that undemocratic or
external forces threatened to extinguish “free will.” One only need
look at the Anti-Masonic Party of the early nineteenth century, the
American (or Know-Nothing) Party of the mid-nineteenth century, or
the so-called “Dixiecrats,” in the late 1940s, to find evidence that antiestablishment and anti-government sentiment has existed in a
continuum in the United States.180 Although these “third-parties”
generally disappeared after one or two election cycles, their
underlying ideologies were often subsumed into the nation’s
majoritarian parties.181 Moreover, the judiciary was not immune
from populist movements.182 In 1854, Supreme Court Justice John
McLean went so far as to encourage nativists–that is, the Know
Nothings–to field anti-government candidates in state and national
elections.183

See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 157 (Ky. 2014).
See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 151, at 132, 149; Sward, supra note 157, at 398.
180 See, e.g., GLENN FELDMAN, THE GREAT MELDING: WAR, THE DIXIECRAT REBELLION, AND
THE SOUTHERN MODEL FOR AMERICA’S NEW CONSERVATISM 83–84, 98–99, 204 (2015); WILLIAM
PRESTON VAUGHAN, THE ANTIMASONIC PARTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1826-1843 99 (1983);
Lorraine Boissoneault, How the 19th-Century Know Nothing Party Reshaped American Politics:
From Xenophobia to Conspiracy Theories, the Know Nothing Party Launched a Nativist
Movement Whose Effects are Still Felt Today, SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www
.smithsonianmag.com/history/immigrants-conspiracies-and-secret-society-launched-americannativism-180961915/.
181 See, e.g., DONALD J. GREEN, THIRD-PARTY MATTERS: POLITICS, PRESIDENTS, AND THIRD
PARTIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (2010); STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN
AMERICA: CITIZEN RESPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 8, 10 (2d. ed. 1984).
182 See, e.g., MICHAEL HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 913–14 (1999); Thomas E. Carney,
The Political Judge: Justice John McClean’s Pursuit of the Presidency, 111 OHIO HIST. 121, 127
(2002).
183 See HOLT, supra note 182, at 913–14 (“McLean had flirted with the Antimasonic
nomination in 1832, bid for the Whig nomination in 1836, and orchestrated a concerted effort
for the party’s 1848 laurels by presenting himself as a No Party reformer.”); Carney, supra note
182, at 127 (“McLean became a perennial candidate, with his name being mentioned at more
than five different nominating conventions; on at least two occasions he withdrew his name
from consideration.”).
178
179
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In 1892, the Populist Party’s presidential candidate, James Baird
Weaver wrote, “[I]t is not alone essential that our courts shall be pure
in fact. The people must have an abiding faith in their integrity.
Society becomes insecure in proportion as popular confidence is
shaken in this respect.”184 Weaver went on to accuse the federal
judiciary of being in league with railroads, bankers, and investors
and alleged a judicial lineage to the pro-slavery justices who served
in the decades prior to the Civil War.185 Although Weaver’s
statements may have been considered revolutionary, his negative
assessment on the judiciary is not novel to United States history.186
Third-party leaders sometimes expressed a belief that the federal
judicial system was designed to prevent the success of an ideology
that challenged the supremacy of prevailing norms.187 In 1905,
Eugene Debs (a labor leader who later ran for president as a Socialist
Party candidate) claimed in a speech titled “Growth of the Injunction”
that the Judicial Branch had departed from its duty of impartiality
and aligned itself with corporations and banks to the detriment of
labor.188 Debs went so far as to call William Howard Taft, a former
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and future
president, a man with “unswerving loyalty to capital and
unmitigated contempt for labor.”189 Debs was hardly a political
outlier. He garnered six percent of the popular vote in a four-way
race against Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson in
1912.190 Deb’s Socialist Party platform included the abolition of the
184 JAMES B. WEAVER, A CALL TO ACTION 67 (1892). Through this work, Weaver insisted
that corporate interests such as privately owned railroads were a threat to freedom, and that
these interests were powerful enough to capture the judicial branch. See id. at 82, 101. He
noted that whoever became president after 1892 would likely have three nominees to the Court
and he drew an analogy to the Court on the eve of the Civil War in which the “slave interests”
had made it impossible for morality to triumph. Id. at 93. Weaver saw corporate interests as
an equal threat to democracy as slavery had been, and he warned that both Harrison and
Cleveland would nominate justices who sided with corporations, just as earlier presidents had
appointed pro-slavery men to the bench. See id. at 80–83.
185 See id. at 80–81, 86, 101.
186 See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 1 (1994); Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, the
Populist Movement and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J. POL. 3, 20–21 (1953).
187 See Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the Curtain: The Supreme Court,
Popular Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem, 73 UMKC L. REV. 53, 56 (2004); John
B. Judis, Us v. Them: The Birth of Populism, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www
.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/13/birth-of-populism-donald-trump.
188 See EUGENE V. DEBS, Growth of the Injunction, in WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EUGENE
V. DEBS 167, 169 (1948) [hereinafter DEBS, Growth of the Injunction].
189 See Id.
190 See Eugene V. Debs, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/us-politics/eugene-v-debs (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019); see also ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY’S PRISONER: EUGENE V. DEBS,
THE GREAT WAR, AND THE RIGHT TO DISSENT 19–20 (2008) (discussing Woodrow Wilson and
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federal injunction as well as diminishing the Judicial Branch’s
jurisdiction to matters involving disputes between the states.191 The
goal of removing the Supreme Court from state judicial decisions
would later be adopted by mid-twentieth century southern
democrats, albeit for a vastly different reason.192
The nation’s first economic downturn, known as the Panic of 1819,
resulted in the first consequential popular attack on an established
state court.193 Kentucky, the fifteenth state admitted to the Union,
saw its state legislature and judiciary engage in a jurisdictional fight
in which the constitutionally established judiciary was voted out of
existence.194 The basis for the legislature’s action had to do with a
popular belief that the banks, particularly the Bank of the United
States, had limited monies during the financial crisis and the
judiciary favored creditors at the expense of beleaguered farmers.195
In 1820, the state’s voting population overwhelmingly elected the
Debt Relief Party—a state-level party—to a majority in both of the
state’s legislative houses.196
Kentucky’s legislature abolished debtors’ prisons and extended the
time that farmers had to pay off their debts.197 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals struck down several of the new laws and, in turn, the
legislature established a new court of appeals in 1824.198 But, the
original appellate court refused to disband and a standoff between
the “Old Court” on the one side, and the legislature and “New Court”
on the other.199 During the two-year period, the “New Court” and the
Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to silencing Debs during the 1912 election).
191 See DEBS, Growth of the Injunction, at 171; FREEBERG, supra note 190, at 85.
192 See KARL FREDERICKSON, THE DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH,
1932-1968 218 (2001); Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: How Congress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 473, 487 (2006).
193 See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 302, 308–09 (2010).
194 See JAMES RAMAGE & ANDREA S. WATKINS, KENTUCKY RISING: DEMOCRACY, SLAVERY,
AND CULTURE FROM THE EARLY REPUBLIC TO THE CIVIL WAR 3 (2011); Admission of States to
Union, U.S. HIST., https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h928.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
195 See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 51–
52 (2015); John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2015);
see also SEAN WILIENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 288
(2005) (discussing the measures taken by the Relief-Party in an effort to enact several prodebtor measures including laws extending the time granted to repay creditors).
196 See WILIENTZ, supra note 195, at 288.
197 See id.
198 See RAMAGE & WATKINS, supra note 194, at 87.
199 See id.; see also ROBERT V. REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE UNION 199 (1991)
(“The struggles between the New Court and the Old Court, which carried forward the quarrel
between the Relief and the Anti-Relief parties, shaped Kentucky Politics throughout the decade
of the 1820s and beyond.”).
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“Old Court,” invalidated each other’s rulings and issued contempt
rulings against their political opponents.200 When, in 1826, the
economic downturn had been reversed, a new legislature invalidated
the new court of appeals.201
A. Nineteenth Century Populism: An Absence of Continuity with the
Present
Defining late nineteenth century populism requires an
understanding that there is a scholarly debate as to whether the
populists transitioned into the progressive wings of the Republican
and Democratic Parties.202 While legal history may perhaps be
considered a distracting diversion, it is important in explaining why
any use of the past century’s populist history as a model to assess the
present would be in error. This is because much of the writing on the
origins, goals, and impact of populism has altered over time.203 In
the mid-twentieth century, mainstream historians accepted an
interpretation by Frederick Jackson Turner that the populist
movement was a democratic revolt in the western states against
eastern business interests.204 Turner hypothesized that the pioneers
who settled in the western frontier had developed an individuality
that resulted in an American ethos or character, which challenged
settled institutions.205 Turner viewed populists as people who
protected democracy by demanding that the government control
forces such as railroads and eastern-based wealth that threatened
democracy’s well-being.206 By characterizing wealthy easterners as
modern-day aristocrats, Turner was able to distinguish late
nineteenth century populism with socialism or other “foreign”

200 See, e.g., John C. Doolan, The Old Court- New Court Controversy, 11 GREEN BAG 177, 183
(1899).
201 See RAMAGE & WATKINS, supra note 194, at 87.
202 See Stuart Chinn, Political Parties and Constitutional Fidelity, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 388,
436–37 (2018); Cliff Schecter, Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party’s March to the Right,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1665–66, 1667 (2002); see also CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER,
AMERICAN RADICALISM, 1861-1901: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS 15 (1946) (describing the
emergence of populism).
203 See Mark A. Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on Populism, Law
Political Science and Constitutional Change, 90 GEO. L.J. 233, 238–39 (2001).
204 See CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 6 (2007).
205 See id. at 26; see also DAVID W. NOBLE, HISTORIANS AGAINST HISTORY: THE FRONTIER
THESIS AND THE NATIONAL COVENANT IN AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING SINCE 1830 51 (1965)
(“In the arid West these pioneers . . . see the sharp contrast between their traditional idea of
America, as the land of opportunity, the land of self-made man, free from class distinctions and
from the power of wealth, and the existing America, so unlike the earlier ideal.”).
206 See NOBEL, supra note 205, at 51.
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ideologies.207 As a result, the modern understanding of nineteenth
century populism is that it was both inherently “American,”
compatible with democracy, and many of its sub-ideologies became
component parts of the modern party system.208
Richard Hofstadter, like Turner, recognized that populism had
rural origins, but he also noted that by 1880, the demographics of the
United States had transitioned from a largely Yankee-Protestant
majority with an attendant morality centered on the concept of hard
work, to a diversified population caused by Eastern and Central
European immigration.209 Unlike Turner, Hofstadter noted that
nineteenth century populism was inherently anti-immigrant, and
labor leaders and skilled craftsmen viewed immigration as a threat
to their economic status.210 More recently, Professor Gretchen Ritter
has argued that, while populism differed by region, the most common
theme was in its anti-monopolistic focus.211 Professor Ritter’s theory
explains the brief alliance between diverse economic groups.212
Midwestern farmers demanded the government own or regulate
banks and railroads, while the labor leaders in the cities vehemently
opposed low-wages associated with immigration.213 Professor Ritter’s
work also takes note of an important facet of American history that
Turner ignored. The decade following 1880 was a period of economic
uncertainty, characterized by labor strikes which approached 10,000
in total.214
In addition to Ritter’s view of populist movements as being antimonopolistic, it is important to note that the populist’s presidential
candidate James Baird Weaver, who had attacked the judiciary, was
not a political outsider. A Union general and Civil War veteran who
fought under General William Sherman, Weaver served three terms
in Congress as a member of the Greenback Party.215 When that party

See id.
See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–67 (2001); Thompson Chengeta, When at Loggerheads with
Customary International Law: The Right to Run for Public Office and the Right to Vote, 43
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 399, 414 (2018).
209 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 8 (1955).
210 See id. at 178.
211 See GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION
AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA 255 (1997).
212 See id. at 256.
213 See id.
214 See FLORENCE PETERSON, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES
1880-1936 21 (1937).
215 See Weaver, James Baird, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., http://bioguide
.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000225 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
207
208
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collapsed, he joined with the Populists.216 While Weaver has largely
been relegated to a historic footnote, it is noteworthy that he received
over eight percent of the popular vote and won all of the Electoral
College votes in Colorado, Nevada and Idaho.217 He also won one of
Oregon’s and North Dakota’s four electoral votes.218
Most
importantly, Weaver was hardly a political outsider.
B. Modern United States Populism
If nineteenth century populism adopted a conviction that the
majority’s identity and their ability to economically succeed had been
diminished by foreign elements, modern right-wing populism adds to
this character a notional belief that there exists a liberal assault on
religion, and an imposed institutional “political correctness” that
neuters fundamental tenets of national existence.219 Moreover, a
current focus of modern populists include doubts as to whether
Hispanic and Muslim citizens can be considered “American.”220
President Trump’s earlier assertion that President Barak Obama
was not a native-born citizen221 was by no means relegated to
campaign hyperbole. In 1993, noted economist Paul Krugman, who
later was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences,
warned that domestic opposition to the North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) was a form of modern populism.222 Krugman
argued that the agreement’s opponents had advanced an overly

216 See JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 1765–1900 355 (1996); Westin, supra note 186, at 3.
217 See RALPH YOUNG, DISSENT: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEA 253 (2015).
218 See id.
219 See, e.g., David Nakamura, Celebrating Merry Christmas Again: Trump Opens New Front
in the Culture Wars, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/celeb
rating-merry-christmas-again-trump-opens-new-front-in-the-culturewars/2017/11/30/e28a40e0-d5ee-11e7-a986d0a9770d9a3e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.401d89ad6931.
220 See Teran Powell, ‘I Wear It Very Proudly that I’m an American’: Janan Najeeb, WUWM
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.wuwm.com/post/i-wear-it-very-proudly-im-american-janan-najeeb
#stream/0; Zac Cheney-Rice, Tom Brokaw Wants Hispanics to Assimilate. Hispanics Aren’t the
Problem., INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 27, 2019) http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/tom-brokawtrumpets-his-ignorance-of-hispanic-assimilation.html; Fabiola Santiago, Latinos can Never
Assimilate Enough for the Tom Brokaws of America, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/fabiola-santiago/article22519
5465.html.
221 See Hanna Krueger et al., Trump’s Most Notable Insults, HILL (July 26, 2015), http://
thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/249102-trumps-most-notable-insults.
222 Paul Krugman, The Uncomfortable Truth About NAFTA: It’s Foreign Policy, Stupid, 72
FOREIGN AFF. 13, 13–14 (1993); Past Winners of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/economy/pastwinners-of-the-nobel-memorial-prize-in-economic-science.html.
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simplistic and false narrative that American jobs would be lost to
Mexico.223 Some of America’s more prominent NAFTA opponents,
such as Patrick Buchanan, added to this narrative that NAFTA
presented a danger to America’s identity.224 Although NAFTA is
almost twenty-five years old, it remains a rally-point for modern
populists.225
According to University of Georgia political science professor, Cas
Mudde, modern populism is a “thin ideology.”226 Unlike socialism or
fascism, Professor Mudde posits that populism “calls for kicking out
the political establishment, [without] specify[ing] what should
replace it.”227 Professor Mudde points out that populism is also a
label which is seldom claimed by the people advancing its ideology,
and indeed the term “populism,” carries several negative
connotations.228 University of Oregon political science Professor
Joseph Lowndes, argues that modern United States populism has, at
its core, an appeal to both “whiteness and masculinity.”229 As
examples for this argument, Lowndes begins with the presidential
campaign of George Wallace in 1968, and then uses Richard Nixon’s
attacks on liberal elites, as well as Ronald Reagan’s campaign against
“welfare queens.”230 The real target of these attacks, Lowndes points
out, was not the individual recipients of welfare or the nation’s
universities, but rather, a federal government which enabled a
system to take resources from working “middle Americans,” and
transfer these to others, ostensibly non-white Americans.231 Lowndes
concludes his essay on populism with an exposition on President
Trump’s campaign, which included veiled promises to regain a period
in which a white majority was also the dominant political and
economic voice.232
Professor Pippa Norris, a Harvard University political science
See Krugman supra note 222, at 14.
See FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 270 (1998).
225 See Simon Lester & Inu Manak, A Framework for Rethinking NAFTA for the 21st
Century: Policies, Institutions, and Regionalism 2–3 (Ctr. for Trade & Econ. Integration,
Working Paper No. 2017-10, 2017).
226 Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist: And Is Donald Trump One?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/.
227 Id.
228 See CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 2 (2017).
229 Joseph Lowndes, Populism in the United States, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM
232, 233 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017).
230 Id.
231 See id.
232 See id. at 242.
223
224

EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

1524

Albany Law Review

9/17/19 5:03 PM

[Vol. 82.4

professor, provides a different explanation of modern populism.233
Populism, according to Norris, has three primary dimensions
regardless of whether it is a “right-wing” or “left-wing” movement.234
The first is that moral virtue and power should reside with ordinary
people and not elites.235 Secondly, populism is an inherently antiestablishment movement.236 Finally, it is lacking in structural
mechanisms and there is a tendency to have power concentrated in a
populist movement’s charismatic leader.237 It should be added that
modern right-wing populist rhetoric is partly based on insulting
individuals and groups that its leaders oppose.238 This rhetoric does
have an effect on the federal and state judiciaries in that President
Trump has approached the judiciary consistent with the prevailing
rhetorical norms.239 Indeed, his accusation that Judge Curiel was
incapable of exercising independent judgment because of his
Hispanic heritage, fits neatly in both Professor Norris and Professor
Mudde’s models of populism.240
III. CASE STUDIES ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right of individuals protected
by both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.241 Neither the

233 See Thomas B. Edsall, The Peculiar Populism of Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/opinion/the-peculiar-populism-of-donald-trump
.html; Sean Illing, Why Trump’s Populist Appeal Is About Culture, Not the Economy: A Harvard
Political Scientist on the West’s Cultural Crisis, VOX (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.vox.com
/conversations/2017/3/27/15037232/trump-populist-appeal-culture-economy.
234 See Illing, supra note 233.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id; see also Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 30 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working
Paper No. RWP16-026, 2016) (“Populists support charismatic leaders, reflecting a deep
mistrust of the ‘establishment’ and mainstream parties who are led nowadays by educated
elites with progressive cultural views on moral issues.”).
238 See Robert C. Rowland, Donald Trump and the Rejection of the Norms of American
Politics and Rhetoric, in AN UNPRECEDENTED ELECTION: MEDIA, COMMUNICATION, AND THE
ELECTORATE IN THE 2016 CAMPAIGN 189, 195 (Benjamin R. Warner et al. eds., 2018). There
have also been discussions regarding specific instances of right-wing rhetoric based on the
insult. See, e.g., Eliza Collins, Top 5 Insults Donald Trump Has Used on Twitter, USA TODAY
(Sept. 21, 2016), www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/09/21/top-5-insultsdonald-trump-has-used-twitter/90797666; Krueger, et al., supra note 221; Tessa Stuart,
Donald Trump’s Meanest Twitter Insults, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 10, 2016),
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/donald-trumps-favorite-twitter-insults-20160310.
239 See Wolf, supra note 93.
240 See id.
241 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957)); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570–71 (1942) (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)).

EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

2018/2019]

Evaluating Judicial Standards of Conduct

9/17/19 5:03 PM

1525

federal government nor the state governments can prohibit speech
that may constitute “hate speech.”242 Nonetheless, the federal and
state judiciaries have upheld limits on the speech of government
personnel.243 In spite of these limits, it is not settled if there is a
universal standard of limits for judges. For instance, in Butler v.
State Judicial Inquiry Commission,244 the Alabama Supreme Court
determined that judicial ethics canons prohibiting a candidate for
judicial office from knowingly or recklessly attacking another
candidate with false information was an overbroad restraint on free
speech.245 Likewise, in In re Chmura,246 the Michigan Supreme Court
found that the state’s prohibition against a judicial candidate
disparaging an opponent with false or misleading statements was too
overbroad an intrusion into the right of free speech.247
Although one could analyze the impact of modern “right wing”
populism’s impact on several classes of people, this Article
concentrates on gender, race, and the LGBT community. This section
begins with an analysis of how the principle of free speech has been
used to protect judicial conduct. It then progresses into an analysis
as to how various state supreme courts have assessed discrimination
against the three groups as well as penalized judges who departed
from expected standards of judicial conduct.

A. Free Speech vs. Judicial Impartiality: The (Past) California
Model and Current “Mississippi Approach”
Although there are several appellate court decisions encompassing
a question of whether removal or recusal is an appropriate remedy
for instances where judicial speech expresses discrimination against

See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565
(1973); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 n. 13 (1980) (“[A] governmental employer may
subject its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reasonably necessary
to promote effective government.”). But see Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972) (citing
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (finding that the government can
constitutionally mandate certain speech from government employees through oaths).
244 Butler v. State Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 2001).
245 See id. at 218.
246 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000).
247 See id. at 45.
242
243
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a group,248 a 1982 California Supreme Court decision, In re Stevens249
may be the most helpful in providing context to the tension between
free speech and the regulation of judicial conduct.250 In 1981,
California’s Commission on Judicial Performance concluded that
Judge Charles S. Stevens had, since his appointment in 1971,
“repeatedly and persistently used racial and ethnic epithets, and
made racially stereotypical remarks to counsel and court
personnel.”251 Although the Los Angeles Times reported that Stevens
claimed his comments were “made in jest,” Southern California
nonetheless learned of his statements.252
Most of Judge Stevens’ conduct occurred in his chambers and not
in open court.253 The state commission concluded that there was no
evidence that Judge Stevens had disparately treated litigants or
witnesses on the basis of race, but his conduct was censurable.254 The
California Supreme Court, in a two-paragraph opinion, upheld the
commission’s recommendation of a censure against Judge Stevens on
the basis that it was “prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.”255 The censure, however,
placed no limits on Judge Stevens from accepting future cases.256
Associate Justice Otto Kaus issued a concurring opinion, which
essentially took the majority to task for not fully articulating the
nature of Stevens’ speech, which included racial epithets against
African-Americans and Philippine-Americans in open court.257
248 Compare In re Chevron U.S.A., 121 F.3d 163, 164 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that the
actions complained of meet the standards for recusal . . . but, as we explain, we exercise our
discretion and decline to issue the requested writ.”), and Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 130
(6th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he District Judge had a duty to recuse himself in order to preserve the
indispensable semblance of fairness.”), with Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v.
Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT (¶ 43) (Miss. 2009) (“Judge Osborne’s actions constituted willful
misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . . We thus order
Judge Osborne to be suspended from office for a period of one year.”).
249 In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982).
250 See id. at 99.
251 Id.
252 Phillip Hager, Judge Faces Censure for Ethnic, Racial Remarks, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1982,
at 7.
253 In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 99.
254 See id.
255 Id.
256 See CAL. CONST. art. VI § 18; In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 99.
257 In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 99 (Kaus, J., concurring). While the majority only issued a
brief decision upholding the censure, Associate Justice Otto Kaus concurred where he listed
what he believed to be the most egregious examples of Stevens’ conduct. Justice Kaus noted,

During an in-chambers discussion regarding a criminal case involving two black
defendants and a white victim, Judge Stevens remarked to counsel that black persons
have to learn how to live in their own neighborhoods and that it was “typical” of black
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Associate Justice Stanley Mosk, in his dissent, conceded that he
was appalled with Stevens’ conduct, but he accused the majority of
not adequately protecting free speech.258 Justice Mosk drew a
distinction between on-bench conduct and extrajudicial conduct, and
then argued that the majority punished Stevens for an arena of
behavior that it could not intrude into.259 In doing so, he drew on the
civil rights battles of the previous two decades where “many a redneck sheriff interpreted civil rights speeches—particularly in and
around court houses—as impermissible conduct.”260 In essence,
Justice Mosk, who had been regarded as a liberal pro-civil rights
justice, argued that a greater good required permitting a judge to
have the same free speech protections as the citizenry.261 His purpose
for making this argument was not simply a fear of an administrative
agency being permitted to curtail free speech rights.262 It was also
because he viewed that limits on extrajudicial speech would
undermine the independence of the state judiciary and force judges
to hide their prejudices.263
Judge Mosk’s freedom of judicial speech jurisprudence survives
into the present, but the state courts of appeal who favor its

persons to fight unfairly.
Judge Stevens, during his term in office, referred to black persons as “Jig, dark boy,
colored boy, nigger, coon, Amos and Andy, and jungle bunny.” With one exception, Judge
Stevens did not use these terms in open court or with reference to a party, witness or
attorney in a case before him. In 1974, in a probate case involving a controversy between
black litigants regarding burial of a loved one, Judge Stevens stated in the presence of
court personnel only, “let’s get on with this Amos and Andy show.” On another occasion,
he privately referred to his court clerk as being “lazier than a coon.”
During another in-chambers discussion, Judge Stevens stated to a public defender that
“Filipinos can be good, hard-working people and that they are clean, unlike some black
animals who come into contact with the court.”
Id. at 99–100 (Kaus, J., concurring).
258 See id. at 101 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
259 See id.
260 Id.
261 See id. (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944)); Stanley Mosk,
CAL. SUPREME CT. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.cschs.org/history/california-supreme-court-justices
/stanley-mosk/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
262 See In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 100–01 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
263 See id. at 101. Justice Mosk concluded,
If the day comes—and in view of the majority opinion it may be here—when judges at any
level are to be disciplined for their manner of expression, however primitive, then we no
longer have an independent judiciary in California. Judges will inevitably become timid
and stifled, even though the Constitutions of the United States and of California apply to
all persons; nothing in their text suggests that judges are excluded from protection.
Id.
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continuance tend to protect judges who demean minority groups.264
Moreover, there are instances in which judicial discipline is
imbalanced. In 2009, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in Mississippi
Commission on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, upheld the
suspension of a judge who articulated racially disparaging language
and warned the state judiciary that “[n]o one is compelled to serve as
a judge, but once an individual offers himself or herself for service,
that individual accepts the calling with full knowledge of certain
limitations upon speech and actions in order to serve the greater
good.”265 During a reelection campaign, Judge Solomon Osborne was
quoted as saying to a predominately African-American audience:
“White folks don’t praise you unless you’re a damn fool. Unless they
think they can use you. If you have your own mind and know what
you’re doing, they don’t want you around.”266
The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance—the state’s
statutorily created administrative agency charged with investigating
complaints against judges—recommended a lifetime suspension from
judicial service against Judge Osborne.267 Although the state
supreme court found that Judge Osborne had “a long history of
violating the judicial canons” of ethics, and had already resigned, it
determined that a one year suspension was a more appropriate
remedy.268 One year before the state supreme court upheld the
suspension sanction against Judge Osborne, it upheld a public
reprimand for Judge Nikki Boland after she stated, “AfricanAmericans in Hinds County can go to hell for all I care.”269 There
were factual differences between the conduct of the two judges.
Judge Osborne was in the process of campaigning for reelection and
advanced a defense that his statements—after first denying making

264 Compare CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, ET AL., 1 JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 10.06(3)
(5th ed. 2018) (“Statements of opinion on public issues may be controversial or offensive to
certain groups while still falling in the ambit of protected discourse, particularly where the
statements are ambiguous or context-dependent.”), with id. at § 3.03 (“[A]t the very least, it is
both undignified and discourteous for a judge to make a racially derogatory statement from the
bench, and therefore violative of Canon 3(B)(4) of the 1990 Code, it may also be indicative of
bias.”).
265 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT (¶ 22) (Miss.
2009). The state supreme court is composed of nine elected justices who serve for eight-year
terms. See MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 145B, 149.
266 Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at (¶ 60) (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
267 See id. at (¶ 7) (majority opinion). The Commission is established under Mississippi law.
See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 9-19-1–9-19-31 (1972).
268 Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶¶ 35, 43.
269 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT (¶ 9) (Miss. 2008)
(en banc).
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them—constituted protected speech.270 Judge Boland conveyed her
statements at a judicial conference in Dallas, Texas and then left
from office.271
It is problematic that, while both judges articulated racially
derogatory comments, the Caucasian judge received a reprimand
rather than a suspension, and a harsher punishment was levied
against the African-American judge.272 Put another way, the state
supreme court’s decision regarding Judge Boland arguably contains
an subliminal message that defaming the state’s majority population
carries a greater possibility of removal, then does provoking speech
against minority populations.
If one considers Mississippi’s
demographics, a state with almost three million residents, in light of
the goal of a colorblind judiciary, the uneven discipline of Boland and
Olson could be interpreted as the state judiciary informing both its
majority Caucasian (59.2%) population, and minority AfricanAmerican (37.8%) population that judges who have exhibited a
devaluing of people on the basis of their minority race or national
origin, may one day return to the judiciary at a faster rate than those
who devalue Mississippi’s majority population.273
Wholly absent from either Osborne or Boland is a recognition of
how judicial actions of an explicit nature can constitute community
harm by strengthening implicit biases. According to the American
Public Media Reports, Mississippi’s prosecutors strike AfricanAmerican jurors through the peremptory strike process in criminal
trials at four times the rate that Caucasian jurors are removed.274
Beyond the continued disparate treatment of jurors based on race,
there may be an underlying judicial attitude which conveys to the
legal community a wider acceptability of discrimination against

See Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶¶3, 5.
Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT at ¶ 3. Judge Boland, advanced as her defense that she was
ill at the time she made her comments and also that her speech was protected under the First
Amendment. See id. at ¶¶ 16, 34.
272 Compare Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT at ¶ 68 (finding a public reprimand to be
appropriate), with Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶ 43 (issuing a one-year suspension).
273 See Quick Facts: Mississippi, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/fact/table/ms/PST045218 (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
274 See Will Craft, Mississippi D.A. Has Long History of Striking Many Blacks from Juries,
AM. PUB. MEDIA (June 12, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/mississippidistrict-attorney-striking-blacks-from-juries/; Jerry Mitchell, Report: Mississippi DA Struck
Black Jurors at 4½ Times Greater Rate, CLARION LEDGER (June 12, 2018),
https://www.clarionledge r.com/story/news/2018/06/12/does-da-curtis-flowers-case-seek-strikeblack-potential-jurors/692156002/; Study: Local Mississippi Prosecutors Struck Black Jurors at
More than Four Times the Rate of Whites, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/7123 (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
270
271
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minority populations.275 Notably, some of the state’s justices have
attacked one of the fundamental cornerstones of ensuring equal
treatment under the law. In Czekala-Chathamfiled, v. State ex rel.
Hood,276 the state supreme court issued an order to the state’s lower
courts to accept subject matter jurisdiction over same-sex marriages
and divorces.277 In essence, a majority of the state’s justices
mandated that Obergefell v. Hodges,278 the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion finding that same-sex couples possessed a right under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause to marry, and, commensurately divorce, was the
law of Mississippi.279
Prior to Obergfell, Mississippi’s voters and legislators had opposed
same-sex marriage, by placing into the state constitution a ban
specific to same-sex marriages.280 In Czekala, two of the state’s
justices dissented from the order implementing Obergfell on the basis
that the United States Supreme Court had exceeded its authority.281
Associate Justice Josiah Coleman emphatically asserted that his
state constitutional oath of office barred him from enforcing
Obergfell.282 After accusing five United States Supreme Court
justices of usurping a state’s sovereign authority, he took the
opportunity to place some of the blame on the Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Earl Warren for creating the basis to enable such a
usurpation in the issuance of its early civil rights opinions.283 In
doing so, he asserted that inferior court judges do not owe fealty to
the Supreme Court, but then argued that since Brown v. Board of

275 See Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT at ¶ 68; Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶ 43; In re
Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam); J. Thomas Sullivan, Discrimination in
The Administration of Criminal Justice: Lethal Discrimination, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 69, 110 (2010).
276 Caekala-Chathamfiled v. State ex rel. Hood, 2014-CA-00008-SCT (Miss. 2015).
277 See id. at 187. The Mississippi Supreme Court is composed of nine judges. See MISS.
CONST. art. VI, § 145-B.
278 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
279 See Caekala-Chatamfield, 2014-CA-00008-SCT at ¶¶ 4, 6.
280 MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A. While this article took effect in 2004 after a popular vote,
it should be pointed out that this article replaced an article repealed in 1987 banning interracial
marriage. See MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263 (repealed 1987). The Supreme Court had struck
down such bans in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Hence one could posit that
Mississippi’s legislature and voters resisted immediate implementation of a removal of a prior
restriction on marriage.
281 See Caekala-Chatamfield, 2014-CA-00008-SCT at ¶ 6 (Dickinson, J., dissenting); id. at
¶¶ 3–4 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
282 See id. at ¶ 7 (Coleman, J., dissenting) (“No inferior judge, to my knowledge, has ever
taken an oath of fealty to the United States Supreme Court, but here we take an oath of office
prescribed by the Constitution of Mississippi.”).
283 See id. at ¶¶ 9–10, 15.
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Education, and, in particular Cooper v. Aaron, the Court has
undertaken an error-based attitude that the Constitution is what a
majority of the Court determines it to be.284 Presiding Justice Jess
Hays Dickinson likewise argued in his dissent that Obergfell
undermined Mississippi’s judicial oath of office so as to create a
justiciable issue.285 Both justices, to be sure, were sincere in their
belief that the four United States Supreme Court justices who
dissented in Obergfell correctly accused the majority of
unconstitutionally legislating a new right and in the process
overturning the rights of the state’s voters.286 Yet, the Czekala
dissent may have empowered the state’s lesser judges to articulate
criticisms of equal treatment norms. Having recognized this
possibility, it must be stressed that the justices were wholly within
their judicial authority to dissent and it would undermine judicial
independence to place limits against this type of dissent.287 Yet, the
tenor of their argument could serve as an unintended basis for trial
judges to engage in conduct which stigmatizes minorities and, in
turn, strengthens the community’s implicit biases.
B. LGBT and Equal Rights: The Marriage Cases
In 2016, the Oregon Commission on Judicial Fitness unanimously
recommended removing Judge Vance Day from his position.288 The
state’s administrative commission determined that Judge Day had,
among other deficiencies, violated a state judicial code by
“prohibiting manifestation of bias or prejudice in the performance of
judicial duties.”289 The commission also determined that Day
undermined confidence in the judiciary through willful

See id. at ¶ 10.
See id. at ¶¶ 6, 15 (Dickinson, J., dissenting).
286 See id. at ¶ 6 (“The Obergefell dissenters have raised a question which—as Justice
Coleman explains—implicates our oath of office as justices of this Court: Did the Obergefell
majority engage in legislative enactment, rather judicial interpretation, exceeding the power
conferred upon it by the United States Constitution?”); id. at ¶¶ 14–15 (Coleman, J.,
dissenting).
287 See id. at ¶ 18 (Dickinson, J., dissenting).
288 Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d 907, 912 (Or. 2018). Day first came to the
commission’s attention, in 2012, when he chastised a youth soccer referee over the referee’s
performance at his son’s game. See id. at 914–15. According to the referee, Day handed the
referee his business card indicting that he was a trial judge, and this served to intimidate the
referee. Id. at 914. The commission determined, at first, not to fully investigate this incident
after determining that the complaints against Day were misplaced. Id. at 915.
289 Id. at 912.
Oregon Code of Judicial Ethics, Rule 3.3(B) prohibits a judge from the
manifestation of bias or prejudice in the performance of judicial duties. See OR. MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.3 (2013).
284
285
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misconduct.290 On March 15, 2018, the Oregon Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, upheld six of the eight misconduct charges that
the commission had found Judge Day guilty of.291 Judge Day had
strong beliefs regarding the Second Amendment to the point where
he permitted a former Navy SEAL convicted of DUI to handle
firearms and refused to perform same-sex marriages after
Obergfell.292 Day employed a “screening process” to avoid his office
being used for same-sex marriages.293
In regard to Judge Day’s refusal to perform same-sex marriages,
the state supreme court concluded that “solemnizing marriages,”
while discretionary for judges, is a judicial act and therefore, a judge
cannot “screen” marriage applicants to refuse same-sex couples the
same treatment accorded opposite sex couples.294 The Oregon
Supreme Court reminded trial judges that the state’s judicial rule
prohibiting a judge from manifesting bias is measured by whether a
member of the public would find a judicial act an obvious indicia of
judicial bias.295 The Court went on to note that racial slurs and
epithets, as well as other actions to demean a class of persons based
on race, religion, gender, or national origin, were clearly within the
prohibited conduct of the rule.296 But the rule also prohibits
“irrelevant references to personal characteristics” and “facial
expressions and body language [that] convey to parties and lawyers
in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias
or prejudice.”297
In assessing Judge Day’s use of a screening process, the Court
upheld the commission’s determination that Day’s actions were
See Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d at 923.
See id. at 912.
292 Whitney Woodworth, State Dismisses Criminal Charges Against Suspended Judge Vance
Day, SALEM STATESMAN J. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news
/crime/2018/10/23/judge-vance-day-criminal-charges-dismissed-oregon/1744815002/.
The
Oregon Supreme Court concluded,
290
291

Day genuinely cared about the participants. He put his “heart and soul” into the VTC,
motivated by his desire to honor and assist veterans, not to promote his own interests. He
had “tremendous respect” for the participants, cared for them, and wanted to help their
positive transition back to society. The record also shows that respondent had a deep
respect for, a sincere interest in, and a fascination with, military history and the work of
the armed forces.
Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d at 916.
293 See Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d at 921–22.
294 See id. at 951, 953.
295 See id. at 951–52.
296 See id. at 951.
297 Id.
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willful.298 The Court then upheld the recommended sanction against
Judge Day and removed him from his judicial duties for a three year
period.299 While the Court focused on Judge Day’s disregard for
upholding the trust of his office, part of the basis for the Court’s
lengthy sanction against Judge Day was to promote public confidence
in the judiciary.300 Day appealed to the Supreme Court, but on
October 9, 2018, the Court denied certiorari to his appeal.301
While Judge Day is not solely responsible for widespread news
reporting on his activities in the sense that he did not initiate
interviews or contact media personnel, it must be noted that his
conduct was widely reported in Oregon, and across the United
States.302 The New York Post reported that Day had hung a picture
of Hitler in his courtroom, but conceded that Day might have done
this as a misunderstood honor to World War II veterans who defeated
Nazi Germany.303 The state’s leading newspaper in terms of
circulation, The Oregonian reported that Day’s suspension was the
third longest in the state’s history.304 CBN News offered a defense of
Day under the claim that his devout Christian faith was the target of
the state judicial commission.305 By the end of 2015, Judge Day

See id. at 953.
See id. at 959. The Court noted: “A suspension may be appropriate if a judge engages in
misconduct directly related to the judge’s official duties, when the record shows that the judge
does not ‘view[ ] the future in a manner materially different from the past.’” Id. at 957 (citing
In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 210 (Or. 1994)).
300 Id. at 959 (“We conclude that a lengthy suspension is required, to preserve public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”).
301 See Day v. Or. Comm’n on Judicial Fitness & Disability, 139 S. Ct. 324 (2018); Suspended
Oregon Judge Vance Day Strikes Out at U.S. Supreme Court, OREGONIAN (Oct. 9, 2018), https://
www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2018/10/suspended_oregon_judge
_vance_d.html.
302 See, e.g., Aimee Green, Oregon Judge Vance Day Indicted for Allegedly Providing Gun to
Felon, OREGONIAN (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news
/index.ssf/2016/11/oregon_judge_vance_day_indicte.html; Kim Davis Isn’t the Only One
Refusing Same-Sex Marriages, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation-now/2015/09/05/kentucky-clerk-same-sex-marriage-license-religious-freedom
/71770124/; What Does It Mean to Be a Judge?, STATESMAN J. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://
www.statesmanjournal.com/story/opinion/2016/01/27/what-does-mean-judge/79364298/.
303 See Meg Wagner, Oregon Judge Who Refused to Perform Same-Sex Marriages Hung
Picture of Hitler in Courthouse, Bullied Veterans: Documents, N.Y. POST (Sept. 9, 2015), https://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ore-judge-hung-hitler-portrait-courthouse-bullied-vetsarticle-1.2353159.
304 See Aimee Green, Judge Vance Day—Who Wouldn’t Marry Same-Sex Couples—
Suspended for 3 Years, OREGONIAN (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacificnorthwest-news/index.ssf/2018/03/oregon_supreme_court_xxxx_judg.html.
305 See Mark Martin, Christian Judge Who Stood for Marriage May Fall to Deep Blue Liberal
Agenda, CBN NEWS (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2017/april/oregon-judgefights-to-keep-his-job-blames-deep-blue-state-politics.
298
299
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became emblematic of a so-called “culture war.”306 In February 2016,
the Washington Post headlined an article with “Meet the judge who
honors Hitler, hates gays, has ‘pattern of dishonesty.”307 One year
later, the Washington Times headlined an editorial, “In Oregon, the
left targets an Evangelical GOP judge.”308 People appearing in Judge
Day’s courtroom, whether in a litigant, witness, juror, or observer
capacity might well wonder if Judge Day had prejudged a case, even
if he had entered into all cases with an internal determination to
impartial and fair to all parties.
Judge Day also published a brief law review essay in his own
defense as well as a defense of Judge Neely, a Wyoming judicial
officer who refused to perform same-sex marriages.309 Judge Day
began his argument with the observation that “in a constitutional
republic the institution responsible for adjudicating disputes and
interpreting the application of the law must be held in high esteem
by the society it serves.”310 He also recognized the importance of
impartiality and pointed out that in 1346, Parliament, under King
Edward III of England, enacted a statute mandating “equal Law and
Execution of right to all our Subjects, rich and poor.”311 Yet, having
recognized the importance of a judge’s impartial conduct, he argued
that judicial disciplinary commissions and state supreme courts
which upheld disciplinary recommendations have evolved from
punishing actual transgressions to enforcing “conformity of
thought.”312 He claimed he understood the importance of having a
judiciary with a diversity of thought, but added that with Obergfell,
some of the judicial ethics commissions applied a religious litmus test
to the judiciary.313 Judge Day concluded his article with the

306 See, e.g., Culture Wars, a Split America and an Oregon Judge Under Investigation, STATE
(Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article34225287.html.
307 Tom Jackman, Meet the Judge Who Honors Hitler, Hates Gays, Has ‘Pattern of
Dishonesty’, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp
/2016/02/29/meet-the-judge-who-honors-hitler-hates-gays-has-pattern-of-dishonesty/?utm
_term=.2152cd447278.
308 Ralph Z. Hallow, In Oregon, the Left Targets an Evangelical GOP Judge, WASH. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/26/vance-day-evangelicaljudge-targeted-left-oregon/.
309 See Vance R. Day, In re Neely: The “Pedestal Principle” and Judicial First Amendment
Liberties in an Era of Increasing Thought Conformity, 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 119, 125, 133
(2017).
310 Id. at 119.
311 Id. at 123.
312 See id. at 127, 129–30.
313 See id. at 128. Judge Day noted that Justice Samuel Alito warned that Obergfell would
result in discrimination against citizens whose religious beliefs were contrary to the decision.
See id. at 128–29.
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admonition that a judge’s liberty of conscience should be no more
constrained than that of ordinary citizens.314 In a manner similar to
Justice Mosk, Judge Day made an important argument about the
basic constitutional rights of freedom of speech and conscience.315
Like Justice Mosk, Judge Day’s argument did not consider how a
judge’s overt conduct may effect a community’s internal biases and
reinforce stereotypes and assumption that have a probability of
undermining fair trials for litigants who come from disfavored
backgrounds.
In Neely v. Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct and
Ethics,316 the Wyoming Supreme Court found the state commission’s
recommendation to discipline Judge Ruth Neely from her judicial
office after refusing to perform same-sex marriages was merited.317
Judge Neely informed a local newspaper, the Pinedale Roundup, that
her religious beliefs prevented her from performing same-sex
marriages.318 The Wyoming Supreme Court articulated that its
decision was not an appraisal of the legality of same-sex marriages,
or the reasonableness of Judge Neely’s religious beliefs.319 Moreover,
the state justices acknowledged that Judge Neely had continuously
served as a part-time magistrate since 1994, a date prior to
Obergefell, and had sought guidance from the state’s Judicial Ethics
Advisory Committee before she knew of the commission’s
investigation.320 However, in 2014, a United States District Court, in
an unpublished order, enjoined Wyoming from enforcing any law or
judicial rule that prohibited same-sex marriages.321 Thus, in addition
to Obergfell, there was a federal district court order requiring the
state to not only permit same-sex marriages, but also raise no
barriers to the state’s citizens who wanted a same-sex marriage.322
Judge Neely raised two arguments against her removal.323 The
See id. at 133.
See id. at 130.
316 Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728 (Wyo.
2017).
317 Id. at ¶ 1, 390 P.3d at 732. Judge Neely was a part time magistrate. Id.
318 Id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734.
319 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8, 390 P.3d at 732, 734. The court accepted that Judge Neely’s religious
beliefs were sincere and that her religious convictions served as a personal bar to her
performing same-sex marriages. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8, 390 P.3d at 732, 733.
320 See id. at ¶¶ 4, 10–11, 390 P.3d at 733, 734; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (decided June 26, 2015, 20 days after Judge Neely’s inquiry to the Judicial Ethics
Advisory Committee).
321 Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at *21-22 (D. Wyo.
Oct. 17, 2014).
322 See id.
323 Neely, 2017WY 25, ¶¶ 15, 31, 390 P.3d at 735, 739.
314
315
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first was that her religious rights under the federal and state
constitutions were protected against the type of judicial discipline
imposed on her.324 Secondarily, because there were magistrates
willing to perform same-sex marriages, her removal was not
incompatible with further judicial service.325 The Wyoming Supreme
Court determined that while Judge Neely had a constitutional right
to her beliefs, Williams-Yulee held that the preservation of public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary was a compelling interest
that required public censure.326 The state judiciary also noted that
unlike other religious conviction decisions arising from mandatory
societal functions such as public schools, judicial service requires a
commitment to impartiality.327 The state supreme court reviewed
Judge Neely’s conduct independent of the commission and
determined that she had undermined the duty to promote confidence
in the judiciary by evidencing a lack of impartiality and
independence.328 However, the justices determined that permanent
removal was too harsh of a remedy as it would “unnecessarily
circumscribe protected expression,” and instead concluded that
censure was more appropriate, coupled with an order to either
perform same-sex marriages or no marriages at all.329
A different result was reached by the Mississippi Supreme Court
in 2004 in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v.
Wilkerson.330 In 2002, Judge Connie Glenn Wilkerson published a
letter in The George County Times in which he argued that
“homosexuals belong in mental institutions.”331 In response to this
letter and an ensuing complaint, the state judicial performance
commission charged Judge Wilkerson with “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice” and bringing his office into disrepute.332
The state supreme court, however, placed paramountcy on the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech in reviewing Judge

See id. at ¶ 15, 390 P.3d at 735.
See id. at ¶ 31, 390 P.3d at 739.
326 See id. at ¶¶ 1, 20, 390 P.3d at 732, 736 (citing Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct.
1656, 1666 (2015)).
327 See Neely, 2017 WY 25, at ¶ 36, 390 P.3d at 741 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
235–36 (1972)).
328 See Neely, 2017 WY 25, at ¶ 66, 390 P.3d at 750.
329 See id. at ¶¶ 75–76, 390 P.3d at 753.
330 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (Miss. 2004).
331 Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. Based in Lucedale, Mississippi, the George County Times has been in
continuous operation since 1904. See GEORGE CTY. TIMES, http://www.gctimesonline.com/ (last
visited March. 1, 2019).
332 Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 13).
324
325
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Wilkerson’s actions.333 In doing so, the state justices emphasized
Minnesota v. White over the Canons of Judicial Ethics’ goal of
maintaining an impartial judiciary in both fact and appearance.334
Moreover, the state justices framed Judge Wilkerson’s conduct as
being a part of a larger political debate regarding gay rights.335 It is
true that the state supreme court decided Wilkerson prior to
Obergefell, and had Judge Wilkerson’s statements been directed
specifically at same-sex marriage, the state’s justices would have
been able to frame his conduct as part of an ongoing political and
legal debate.336 But, Judge Wilkerson directed his public statements
against a class of persons who constitute a percentage of Mississippi’s
population, and it would be likely that a member of the class would
appear in his courtroom. The state supreme court also held that
Judge Wilkerson’s statements constituted protected religious speech
and any limitation on such speech constituted a prior restraint
without a compelling interest.337 While the decision was issued prior
to Yulee, it is important to point out that neither the majority nor
dissenting opinions acknowledge that White involved the speech of a
lawyer running for an elected judicial position, while Wilkerson
involved the speech of a judicial officer who was currently serving in
that capacity.338
The Mississippi Supreme Court emplaced another flaw in
Wilkerson by finding a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit analogous to the issue raised by Wilkerson’s behavior.339 The
Fifth Circuit’s decision, Scott v. Flowers had nothing to do with a
broad political issue.340 The underlying facts in Scott stem from an
elected justice of the peace named James M. Scott, who took exception
to a county court overturning his assessment of fines against persons
charged with traffic infractions.341 Rather than file a complaint
See id. at ¶ 7.
See id. at ¶¶ 21–22 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75
(2002)).
335 See Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 23).
336 Compare id. at ¶ 3 (in Wilkerson the court was asked to address speech that targeted the
sexual orientation of some individuals), with Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015)
(in Obergefell the court was asked to address the prohibition of same-sex marriage, not a
person’s self-identification as homosexual).
337 Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶¶ 34, 44).
338 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1656 (2015); Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT
(¶ 21) (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002)); Wilkerson,
2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶¶ 66–67, 75) (Carlson, J. dissenting) (citing White, 536 U.S. at 774–78).
339 See Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 24) (citing Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 203 (5th
Cir. 1990)) (labelling Flowers as a factually similar case).
340 See Flowers, 910 F.2d at 203-04.
341 See id.
333
334
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through the judicial system, Scott authored an “open letter” to county
officials decrying “an injustice in the administration of the county
court system,” with a claim that “the county court system is not
interested in justice.”342 After a local newspaper published the letter,
and a county judge filed a complaint, the Texas Commission on
Judicial Conduct issued a formal reprimand.343 However, the state
commission did not document an instance where Scott had wrongly
treated a traffic court litigant.344
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it
possessed jurisdiction over Scott’s lawsuit against the state
commission because it found that the state commission’s censure
constituted a judicial act, and this act implicated a First Amendment
right of free speech.345 The appellate court next determined that
Scott, even as a public employee, had a right to openly address
matters of public concern that were not specific to the conditions of
his own employment.346 That is, Scott had attempted to educate the
county voters that the administration of justice, in his opinion,
threatened the safety of the county, and as a result, the commission’s
action could not withstand scrutiny.347 The best that can be said
about the Mississippi Supreme Court’s analysis is that it championed
the principle of transparency in noting that Judge Wilkerson did not
hide his beliefs, and it indicated to him that he would likely face

342
343
344
345

Id. at 203-04, 205.
See id. at 204.
See id. at 204-05.
See id. at 205, 208-09.

Thus, Scott had no vehicle other than a civil rights suit by which to challenge the
Commission’s allegedly unconstitutional reprimand. Although he could have elected to
bring such an action in either state or federal court, his choice of the federal forum does
not in any way suggest a deliberate circumvention of state court review. We thus conclude
that we have jurisdiction to consider Scott’s first amendment claims, and we now proceed
to evaluate their merits.
Id. at 208-09.
346 Id. at 211 (quoting Moore v. Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 1989)).
347 Scott, 910 F.2d at 211-13.
Neither in its brief nor at oral argument was the Commission able to explain precisely how
Scott’s public criticisms would impede the goals of promoting an efficient and impartial
judiciary, and we are unpersuaded that they would have such a detrimental effect.
Instead, we believe that those interests are ill served [sic] by casting a cloak of secrecy
around the operations of the courts, and that by bringing to light an alleged unfairness in
the judicial system, Scott in fact furthered the very goals that the Commission wishes to
promote.
Id. at 213.
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recusal motions in the future.348 However, this places a burden on a
litigant to challenge the judge.349
On March 2, 2018, the United States District Court for the District
of Alabama sided with Alabama Supreme Court Justice Tom Parker,
and issued an injunction against the State Judicial Inquiry
Commission from disciplining Parker on the basis of a speech that he
made after Obergefell had been issued, but before the state supreme
court determined whether Obergefell required state judicial officers
to perform same-sex marriages.350 In 2015, during a radio interview,
Parker challenged Obergfell’s constitutionality and suggested that
Alabama could ignore Obergfell much as Wisconsin had once ignored
Dred Scott.351 In 2018, Parker sought federal relief against the state
commission because he was campaigning to be elected as the state’s
chief justice, and he believed that his views on federalism and his
arguments on Supreme Court overreach were valid campaign
speech.352 The United States District Court agreed with Parker’s
argument and issued an injunction against the commission.353 On
November 6, 2018, Parker was elected chief justice.354 As a result,
Parker was free, as a sitting judge, to not simply criticize the
Supreme Court, but also to advocate for the disparate treatment of
LGBT persons.
C. Race and National Origin
Like sexual harassment, racially divisive judicial conduct has a
deleterious effect on the fair adjudication of legal proceedings.355 Yet,
there have been instances where state supreme courts have found a
means to protect judicial appeals to racial divisions on the basis of

348 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶¶ 3, 41)
(Miss. 2004).
349 See id. at ¶ 41.
350 See Parker v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n of Ala., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1312 (M.D. Ala.
2018); Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). Prior to Obergefell, same-sex
marriages were not recognized in Alabama and judges were prohibited from issuing marriage
licenses. See Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., 200 So. 3d 495, 500 (Ala. 2015); Parker,
295 F. Supp. 3d at 1295.
351 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see Parker, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1295–96.
352 See Parker, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1297.
353 See id. at 1311.
354 Samantha Michaels, Roy Moore’s Protégé Was Just Elected as Alabama’s Supreme Court
Chief Justice, MOTHER JONES, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/roy-moore-tomparker-alabama-roe-v-wade-supreme-court-justice/ (last updated Nov. 6, 2018).
355 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 1–3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A judge
who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and
brings the judiciary into disrepute.”).
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protected speech. In 2003, in Griffen v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline
and Disability Commission,356 the Arkansas Supreme Court quashed
an admonishment of a judge who had encouraged the state
legislature to consider withholding funds from the University of
Arkansas.357 In 2002, Judge Wendell Griffen addressed the Arkansas
Legislative Black Caucus after the university terminated the
employment of a long-serving African-American athletic coach.358
Judge Griffin asked the caucus members to consider that the
termination decision was based on the coach’s race rather than the
basketball team’s win-loss record, and that the firing was emblematic
of racial inequities in the state.359 His proposed solution to the
legislature was the withholding of funds from the university.360 In
doing so, he intimated that a majoritarian Caucasian student
population would feel the effects of defunding more than Arkansas’
African-American student population.361
He defended himself by arguing that his statements were
permitted as a matter of a judge consulting the legislative branch on
a matter of personal interest and that his statements were also
protected by the First Amendment.362 The Judicial Commission
determined that Republican Party of Minnesota v. White only applied
to elections and therefore Judge Griffen could be sanctioned.363
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that White’s
admonition against curtailing speech in the absence of a compelling
interest meant the state rules governing judicial conduct also had to

356
357
358
359

Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 130 S.W.3d 524 (2003).
See id. at 538.
See id. at 525–26.
See id. at 526–27. Judge Griffen stated,

Our citizens are still paying, financially, emotionally, academically, and culturally, for
inequities in public secondary education that followed the curse Governor Faubus left on
our state. . . . Show them you will not support schools where black students, professors,
and staff members are forced to watch their opportunities in higher education languish
while their white counterparts enjoy most favored status at state expense. Chancellor
White and Frank Broyles say they fired Coach Richardson because they lack confidence in
his leadership, despite the successful results he produced over the past seventeen years.
Whether you believe them or not–and I do not believe them–send them a budgetary vote
of no confidence concerning sorry leadership about racial inclusion over the past 130 years
at the University of Arkansas. SHOW THEM THE MONEY!
Id. at 526–27.
360 See id. at 526–27.
361 See id.
362 See id. at 528.
363 See id. at 535.
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clearly prohibit specific behavior.364 In this instance, the justices
determined that the rule permitting legislative consulting was too
vague to permit a penalty against the judge.365 The Arkansas
Supreme Court’s decision is problematic because it fails to address
limits on racially-based speech designed to deprive a class of people
access to a basic institution. What if a judge were to argue that the
state university system had accepted too many members of an
“undeserving” minority group at the expense of the rest of the state’s
population? Would the state supreme court have arrived at a
different result?
Another problematic decision was issued by the South Dakota
Supreme Court in 2011. In In re Fuller,366 the state justices reviewed
the conduct of a long-serving judge which included the judge
screaming at female clerks and calling an attorney an “asshole” in
open court.367 His racial speech included instances where he took
down Native American artwork from the courtroom walls when
attorneys needed to use an image projector and while returning the
artwork he informed the court, “this is where I hang my Indians.”368
While the South Dakota Supreme Court forced Judge Fuller to accept
retirement, they left open the possibility that he could return to the
bench and noted: “[h]istory is replete with those who have overcome
a weakness or character flaw and risen to what Attorney at Law
Abraham Lincoln declared to be the ‘better angels of our nature.’”369
Almost nine percent of South Dakota’s population is Native
American,370 and would be reasonable to conclude that both Judge
Fuller and the South Dakota Supreme Court had enabled a
See id. at 536.
See id. It should be noted that most recently, Judge Griffen has been confronted with
new allegations that he acted unethically as a judge. In this instance, the judge participated
in an anti-death penalty demonstration where he laid on a cot while clothed in prison garb. See
Max Brantley, Judge Griffen Moves to Dismiss Disciplinary Action, Cites Supreme Court
Involvement, ARK. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives
/2019/04/05/judge-griffen-moves-to-dismiss-disciplinary-action-cites-supreme-courtinvolvement. Rather than remove Judge Griffen from his position as a judge, the Arkansas
Supreme Court removed him from hearing death penalty cases. See In re Kemp, 894 F. 3d 900,
903 (8th Cir. 2018). While there is nothing in Griffen’s later action that was directly based on
conduct of a racial, sexist, or other discriminatory matter, it is clear that the earlier response
of the state supreme court did not place the judge on sufficient notice to conform to judicial
standards.
366 In re Fuller, 2011 S.D. 22, 798 N.W.2d 408.
367 See id. at ¶¶ 19–20, 798 N.W.2d at 413.
368 Id. at ¶ 30, 798 N.W.2d at 415.
369 Id. at ¶¶ 54, 55, 798 N.W.2d at 421, 422 (quoting In re Discipline of Laprath, 2003 S.D.
114, ¶ 87, 670 N.W.2d 41, 66).
370 See Quick Facts: South Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/sd (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
364
365
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furthering of community harm by strengthening anti-Native
American biases.
There are state supreme courts which have placed the duty of
impartiality above the concept of unbridled free speech.371 The
Washington Supreme Court presents one example. In In re
Hammermaster, the state supreme court upheld a sanction against a
judge who inquired into the legal status of Hispanic witnesses and
defendants.372 The state commission recommended a censure and
thirty day suspension against the judge, but the state supreme court
ordered a censure and six month suspension.373 In Sanders v.
Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct,374 the
Washington Supreme Court, concerned with the “substantial basis
and expectation that Justice Sanders would be in contact with
possible litigants who had pending litigation before the court,” upheld
a sanction against a state supreme court justice which included a
public admonishment.375 The sanction arose, in part, from the
justice’s visit to a sexual offender facility and meeting with
defendants who had cases pending before the court.376 Given
Washington’s progressive acceptance of the ills of implicit bias, it is
unsurprising that the state supreme court would depart from a longstanding norm that each justice on a court of final appeal has the sole
authority to decide whether they should serve on a particular issue.
New York also presents a system which recognizes that a judge’s
racially divisive speech will not only undermine the judicial branch,
it will also contribute to stigmatizing a group of people.377 In 1985,
the Court of Appeals of New York determined that racism was
incompatible with judicial service.378 In In re Mulroy,379 the New

371 See In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 936 (Wash. 1999) (“Judicial independence does
not equate to unbridled discretion to bully and threaten, to disregard the requirements of the
law, or to ignore the constitutional rights of defendants.”).
372 See id. at 941.
373 See id. at 942, 943.
374 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 145 P.3d 1208 (Wash. 2006).
375 See id. at 1212–13.
Justice Sanders was no stranger to complaints and judicial
disciplinary proceedings. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 377
(Wash. 1998); Maureen O’Hagan, Justice Sanders Admonished for Ethics-Rules Violation,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 9, 2005), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/justice-sandersadmonished-for-ethics-rules-violation/.
376 See Sanders, 145 P.3d at 1209.
377 See In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1985).
378 See id. During sentencing proceedings, Judge Agresta, during a guilty plea colloquy,
accused the defendant of not cooperating with the prosecution in regard to informing on his
peers. See id. Justice Agresta stated: “I know there is another nigger in the woodpile. I want
that person out. Is that clear? What about that Mr. Blount? You want to think it over?” Id.
379 In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120 (N.Y. 2000).
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York Court of Appeals upheld the state commission’s determination
to remove a judge who articulated racially disparaging remarks in
describing the victim of a crime.380 While at a charity event, Judge J.
Kevin Mulroy approached a prosecutor and began an ex parte
discussion about a pending murder trial involving four defendants.381
Although this type of ex parte conversation is generally considered a
violation of a judge’s duty of impartiality, the contents of the
conversation proved more troubling than the violation of the ex parte
prohibition.382
Judge Mulroy urged the prosecutor to offer
“reasonable” plea deals to the defendants before assuring the
prosecutor that the community would not negatively react to such a
deal since the sixty-seven year old murder victim was “just some old
nigger bitch.”383 In a very brief decision, the appellate court
determined that regardless of Judge Mulroy’s prior judicial record,
this record could not be used to excuse or mitigate racial epithets or
ethnic slurs in a quasi-official context and therefore, removal was the
appropriate sanction.384
In contrast to New York, in 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court
determined that the state judicial commission’s recommendation to
suspend a judge without pay for one year was too severe of a
punishment for the judge’s conduct.385 In 2003, Judge Timothy
Ellender attended a Halloween costume party in which he and his
spouse dressed as prisoners.386 During the party, the judge donned
an “afro wig” and applied black makeup in a manner described as
“blackface.”387 In early November, the local media reported the

380 See id. at 121, 123. It should be noted that Judge J. Kevin Mulroy was also accused of
failing to act in an impartial manner and had advanced his personal influence through his
judicial office. See id. at 123. One of the distinguishing features of Judge Mulroy’s appeal to
the state’s highest appellate court was that it was accompanied by three amicus briefs. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae County Judges Ass’n of the State of New York, In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d
120, 1999 WL 33659949 (arguing that the permanent removal of Judge Mulroy would curtail
the independence of trial judges); Brief of Amicus Curiae Onondaga County Bar Ass’n Assigned
Counsel Program, Inc., In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 1999 WL 33660417 (conceding that Judge
Mulroy had made “a number of ill-advised and careless comments” but the sanction of a
permanent removal was too severe); Brief of Amicus Curiae Syracuse Ass’n of Defense Lawyers
on Behalf of Hon. J. Kevin Mulroy, In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 1999 WL 33659950 (arguing
that a permanent removal would permit the government to “subject [judges] to unwarranted
criticism”).
381 See In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d at 121.
382 See id.
383 Id. The appellate court noted that in a prior instance, Judge Mulroy denigrated ItalianAmericans. Id.
384 See id. at 123.
385 In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 5, 13 (La. 12/13/04); 889 So. 2d 225, 229, 234.
386 Id. at p. 2, 889 So. 2d at 227.
387 See id.
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judge’s conduct, and shortly after, New Orleans’ television stations
and CNN reported on the judge.388 Judge Ellender admitted to his
conduct, but nevertheless “refuted the allegation that . . . called into
question his . . . ability to be fair and impartial.”389 Further, Judge
Ellender denied that he had portrayed African-Americans in a
derogatory manner.390 The state judicial commission recommended
the suspension of Judge Ellender without pay for a one year period.391
Justice Chet Traylor, in writing the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
majority opinion, began by assuring the public that the state’s judges
had be above reproach so that their conduct bolstered public
confidence in the judiciary.392 The majority opinion not only upheld
the suspension, it also required Judge Ellender to enroll in a
university course focused on the effect of racism in society.393 Two
justices dissented against the decision on the basis that Judge
Ellender’s conduct was an isolated incident and that he had publicly
apologized for it, and therefore the one-year suspension was
excessive.394 Judge Ellender returned to his judicial position in 2005,
but in 2009, he was suspended once more.395 This allegation of
misconduct was based on discourteous conduct toward a female
litigant in a hearing for a temporary restraining order brought by a
wife on behalf of herself and her daughters; which indicated that
because no physical abuse had occurred, Judge Ellender found there
had been no wrongdoing and in which he admonished the wife for
bringing an action for a temporary restraining order rather than
divorce.396 Clearly, Judge Ellender, like Judge Kozinski, did not
consider his previous discipline as being worthy of cognition.397
There is another troubling aspect to Judge Ellender’s conduct. A
See id.
See id. at p. 3–4, 889 So. 2d at 228.
390 See id.
391 See id. at p. 5, 889 So. 2d at 229.
392 See id. at p. 9, 889 So. 2d at 231.
393 See id. at p. 11–12, 13, 889 So. 2d at 233, 234. The court found that Judge Ellender did
not intend to offend any person and noted that an examination of Judge Ellender’s behavior
demonstrated his inability to understand the magnitude of his actions. See id. at p. 12, 889 So.
2d at 233.
394 See id. at p. 2, 3–4, 889 So. 2d at 234–35 (Victory, J., dissenting); id. at p. 1, 889 So. 2d
at 235 (Hightower, J., dissenting).
395 See In re Ellender, 09-0736, p. 8 (La. 07/01/09), 16 So. 3d 351, 356.
396 See id. at p. 2–3, 6, 16 So. 3d at 353, 355. This time, the Court upheld a thirty-day
suspension for Judge Ellender and ordered him to undertake a domestic violence course. Id. at
p. 15, 16 So. 3d at 360; see also, Tom Planchet, Terrebone Judge Timothy Ellender Suspended
Again, HOUMA TODAY (July 1, 2009), http://www.houmatoday.com/news/20090701/terrebonnejudge-timothy-ellender-suspended-again (discussing Judge Ellender’s suspension).
397 See In re Ellender, 09-0736, p. 13, 16 So. 3d at 358 (Judge Ellender argued that his past
conduct was sufficiently different from the conduct under review in this instance).
388
389
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small number of courts have recognized that the use of blackface can
constitute an act of racism, even when done as a parody.398 In Tindle
v. Caudell, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined
that the employment termination of a police officer who appeared in
“blackface” at a private Halloween party did not violate the officer’s
First Amendment rights.399 However, a decade earlier, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Berger v. Battaglia,400 determined
that the use of “blackface” for the purposes of public parody, would
not justify the termination a police officer’s employment since the act
was protected by the First Amendment.401 The Fourth Circuit
recognized that a police officer’s use of blackface in an open setting in
which the officer performed an Al Jolson rendition, could be an
affront to the relevant community, in this case, a portion of
Baltimore’s population, but the population’s right to confront the
officer was through peaceful protest.402
D. Sexism and Sexual Harassment: “Locker Room Talk”
In contrast to judicial conduct relating to LGBT persons, several
state commissions and state supreme courts have shown strength in
disciplining judges who engage in sexist behavior.403 This section
concentrates on sexist behavior of a not physically assaultive nature.
Judicial behavior which fits within the definition of a crime is likely
to result in a finding that the offending judge is not fit—whether
temporarily or permanently—to serve in a judicial capacity.404 For
instance, a judge who publicly shoves his spouse during an argument
may be suspended until the judge completes a domestic violence
program.405 There are, however, questions as to whether a judge who
sexually harasses or demeans office staff may be suspended or
removed for such conduct, or, for that matter evidences a bias against
women.406
See, e.g., Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 968, 973.
400 Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
401 Id. at 1001.
402 Id. at 994, 1001.
403 See In re Carpenter, 17 P.3d 91, 92, 95 (Ariz. 2001); In re Assini, 720 N.E.2d 882, 883,
885–86 (N.Y. 1999) (per curiam); Kennick v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591,
593, 605 (Cal. 1990).
404 See generally Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourt
s.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“A judge
should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”).
405 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Turco, 970 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. 1999).
406 Compare In re Gordon, 917 P.2d 627, 627 (Cal. 1996) (finding a public reprimand through
398
399
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Although this Article focuses on state judicial conduct, there is a
federal judicial example that presents warnings as to the danger of
not adequately sanctioning judges who act in a sexist manner.407 In
2009, Chief Justice John Roberts convened a special panel composed
of the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit to investigate the conduct
of Judge Alex Kozinski, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.408 An attorney had informed The Los Angeles
Times that Kozinski had pornography on his website and then
formally issued a complaint against Kozinski.409 Judge Kozinski
maintained a website which contained “‘a photo of naked women on
all fours painted to look like cows,’ ‘a video of a half-dressed man
cavorting with a sexually aroused farm animal,’ and ‘a graphic stepby-step pictorial in which a woman is seen shaving her pubic hair.’”410
Kozinski admitted to maintaining the images on his website but
testified that he believed the website was for private storage purposes
and therefore not available to the public.411 After a detailed analysis,
the Third Circuit’s special panel concluded that an admonishment
was sufficient to resolve the complaint.412 While the investigation
and subsequent action of the investigation were purely a federal
matter, the outcome evidences that an admonishment for a judge
collecting and showing electronic displays demeaning to women may
not be enough of a deterrent against undermining impartiality in the
future. In 2017, six former law clerks and administrative personnel
accused Judge Kozinski of sexual misbehavior.413 By the end of that
year, another nine women accused him of similar conduct.414 On
December 18, 2017, Judge Kozinski retired from his judicial duties
the issued decision as the appropriate response for the judge’s “sexually suggestive remarks”),
with In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 108–109, 124 (N.J. 1993) (finding a sixty-day suspension and
a required sexual harassment educational program to be a proper punishment for sexual
harassment).
407 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 295 (3d Cir. 2009).
408 See id. at 279–80, 283.
409 Id. at 281.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 See id. at 295.
413 See Matt Zapotosky, Federal Appeals Judge Announces Immediate Retirement Amid
Probe of Sexual Misconduct Allegations, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-appeals-judge-announces-immediateretirement-amid-investigation-prompted-by-accusations-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/18
/6e38ada4-e3fd-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html?utm_term=.4bf64705342d.
414 See Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappropriate
Behavior, Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed Them, Wash. Post (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nine-more-women-say-judgesubjected-them-to-inappropriate-behavior-including-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them
/2017/12/15/8729b736-e105-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html?utm_term=.a816354b06d0.
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and was effectively removed from taking part in further judicial
activities.415
In contrast to the federal judicial council investigation into Judge
Kozinski,416 the West Virginia Supreme Court, in 1995, determined
that a judge’s removal from the bench and suspension of his license
to practice law was an appropriate sanction for using lewd language
to a female court employee as well as touching her without her
consent.417 However, in this decision, the judge entered into an
agreement with the state judicial commission in which he would not
contest the sanctions against him including a $10,000 fine.418 A
decade later, the state supreme court determined that a one-year
suspension was appropriate for a magistrate who propositioned four
female litigants.419
The Montana Supreme Court, in Harris v. Smartt,420 upheld the
removal of a judicial officer who downloaded pornographic images
onto his state-owned computer.421 In that decision, a justice of the
peace was found to have maintained pornography in his chambers
and this pornography was discovered as a result of a computer
administrator trying to diagnose a computer error.422 The state
supreme court recognized that Montana’s constitution afforded
greater privacy rights and free speech protections than the Federal
Constitution, but then concluded the judicial officer violated his duty
of impartiality in fact and appearance.423 Moreover, the state justices
noted that that the judicial officer’s behavior garnered considerable
media attention.424
While the state judicial commission

See Zapotosky, supra note 414.
See Matt Zapotosky, Judiciary Closes Investigation of Sexual Misconduct Allegations
Against Retired Judge Alex Kozinski, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/judiciary-closes-investigation-of-sexual-misconduct-allegationsagainst-retired-judge-alex-kozinski/2018/02/05/e3a94bb8-0ac0-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story
.html?utm_term=.f0c37ebea6c9.
417 See In re Hey, 457 S.E.2d 509, 510–11, 514, 515 (W. Va. 1995).
418 See id. at 511, 515. The maximum discipline available in West Virginia was $5,000. Id.
at 514.
419 See In re Toler, 625 S.E.2d 731, 735, 740 (W. Va. 2005).
420 Harris v. Smartt, 2002 MT 239, 311 Mont. 507, 57 P.3d 58, vacated 2003 MT 135, 316
Mont. 130, 68 P.3d 889.
421 See id. at ¶¶ 13, 21.
422 See id. at ¶¶ 17–18. It must be noted that the judicial officer was also investigated for
sexual assault. See State ex rel. Smartt v. Judicial Standards Comm’n, 2002 MT 148, ¶ 5, 310
Mont. 295, 50 P.3d 150.
423 Smartt, ¶¶ 65, 77, 82 (citing State v. Sheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 724 (Mont. 1995); Gryczan v.
State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997); State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 183 (Mont. 1997); State v.
Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (Mont. 1995)).
424 Harris, ¶ 83. See Commission Urges JP’s Ouster, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Nov. 30, 2001),
https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/commission-urges-jp-s-ouster/article_ca303793-3376415
416
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recommended a permanent suspension from office and Montana’s
supreme court adopted this recommendation, it is noteworthy that
the state justices found that there was a deleterious effect on the
public’s view of the state judiciary, and the judicial officer’s claim that
“he was composing a joke birthday card for his wife,” did not
constitute a defense in this instance.425 It is also noteworthy that one
justice, James Nelson, concurred in the decision but with the caveat
that the state’s judicial ethics canons had to be strengthened and
given greater prohibitory precision.426
The Montana Supreme Court is by no means alone in assessing the
impact of sexism on the bench to both the judiciary and society. In
2015, Pennsylvania’s Judicial Conduct Board filed a complaint
alleging that Justice J. Michael Eakin had abused his authority by
forwarding numerous e-mails that contained statements that were
derogatory in their gender, racial, and ethnic content.427 Many of the
forwarded e-mails were sent from a state computer.428 In between
the board’s determination and Justice Eakin’s appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, he resigned.429 The e-mails contained
images of nude and semi-nude women accompanied by “jokes based
on negative social and gender stereotypes.”430 The state supreme
court determined that “the ‘appearance of impropriety’” standard
extended to off-duty conduct, though it found that Justice Eakin’s use
of a government computer rendered the distinction between off-duty
and on-duty conduct irrelevant.431 Because Eakin had resigned from

5e27-b792-af375a231144.html; JP Collects Full Pay as Case Is Debated, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(July 5, 2002), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/jp-collects-full-pay-as-case-is-debated
/article_f9c7858d-bb32-53dd-a431-b1716c12030a.html; Smartt ‘Not Fit’ to Be Judge,
Commission’s Lawyer Says, MONT. STANDARD (Feb. 14, 2002), https://mtstandard.com/news
/state-and-regional/smartt-not-fit-to-be-judge-commission-s-lawyer-says/article_08cea4b88f22-50ed-ad25-a8ee617439a7.html.
425 See Smartt, ¶¶ 1, 83–84.
426 See id. at ¶ 89 (Nelson, J., concurring). Another justice, Karla Gray, concurred with the
majority’s analysis but dissented from the majority’s determination to suspend the judicial
officer ten days after the decision’s issuance. See id. at ¶ 117 (Gray, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Gray argued that permanent removal should have taken immediate
effect. Id. However, one dissenting justice not only pointed out the evidence used in the
proceeding constituted a violation of the judicial officer’s privacy rights, but also, that the
pornographic images were private use. See id. at ¶¶ 131 147 (Treiweiler, J., dissenting)
(“Smartt simply viewed material in the privacy of his office which most people consider
offensive. For that, his job has been taken away. God protect us from the wrath of the
righteous.”).
427 In re Eakin, 150 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 2016).
428 See id. at 1049.
429 See id. at 1046.
430 Id. at 1051.
431 See id. at 1056, 1057 (quoting In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992)).
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the court, he could no longer be removed.432 Nonetheless, the court
found that Justice Eakin’s conduct merited a penalty.433 The basis
for the penalty, as the court noted, was that the forwarded e-mails
embodied “beliefs [that] are antithetical to the privilege of holding
public office, where the charge is to serve, not demean, our
citizens.”434
In 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court censured and permanently
enjoined Judge Theodore Abrams from holding further judicial office
after it was discovered that he had engaged in an ongoing intimate
relationship with one female attorney who frequently appeared in his
court, and harassed another female attorney who had spurned his
advances.435 Judge Abrams did not notify opposing counsel of his
relationship with the attorney he was involved with, which violated
a separate judicial canon.436 As for his harassment of the second
attorney, the court noted that he had “demean[ed] and humiliat[ed]
her,” and “injured the legal system by exploiting his judicial position
in pursuit of sexual gratification.”437
However, although the
prohibition appears to be a blanket condemnation of judicial sexual
harassment, it must be noted that Judge Abrams had already
resigned at the time of the decision.438
IV. CONCLUSION
In 2015, a study found that prosecutors in Caddo Parrish,
Louisiana exercised peremptory challenges against AfricanAmerican jurors at three times the rate that non-black jurors were
struck.439 Despite the Court’s admonition in Batson,440 it is clear that
there is a discriminatory practice against African-American jurors in
one part of Louisiana. While it is difficult to draw a direct line from
Judge Timothy Ellender’s conduct to that of prosecutors who
432 In re Eakin, 150 A.3d at 1061 (“[W]e substantially and significantly reduce . . . the
sanction given Respondent’s . . . resignation.”).
433 See id.
434 Id. (“With their imagery of sexism, racism, and bigotry, is arrogance and the belief that
an individual is better than his or her peers.”).
435 In re Abrams, 257 P.3d 167, 168, 174–75 (Ariz. 2011).
436 See id. at 168. The canon Judge Abrams violated was Code of Judicial Conduct: Rule
2.11, “failing to disqualify himself ‘in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.’” Id. at 170.
437 Id. at 171.
438 Id. at 169.
439 Alexandria Burris, Black Jurors More Likely to be Struck from Caddo Juries,
SHREVEPORT TIMES, (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/local/2015
/08/17/black-jurors-likely-struck-caddo-juries/31852745/.
440 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986).
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routinely exercise peremptory challenges against minorities, it
cannot be missed that Ellender was not removed from the bench after
disparaging African-Americans.441 Had the state judicial disciplinary
agency or the Louisiana Supreme Court applied a community harm
standard to Ellender and removed him, it at least would have sent a
signal to the prosecutors that racism against minorities has no place
in the charging of crimes or the prosecution’s adjudicatory functions.
Removal may have also brought greater confidence to Louisiana’s
population that the judiciary would follow its own goal of colorblind
impartiality.
It is true that a judge possess the same free speech rights as does
the general citizenry, but various rights, in particular, freedom of
speech, may be curtailed by the fundamental demands of the twin
duties of impartiality and independence.442 It is true that the
Supreme Court has held that a state or the federal government enjoys
greater latitude to regulate speech when it acts in its capacity as an
employer.443 However, the Court has also distinguished the judiciary
from normal employment.444 Although well before the 2016 election
judges had been discovered to have engaged in sexual harassment,
articulated racially disparaging comments, or evidenced hostility to
gays, lesbians, and transgendered (LGBT) persons, there has been a
rise in the political targeting of minorities (including certain religious
minorities) and LGBT persons since that time.445
A trial litigant, whether in a civil or criminal trial, is entitled to a
jury that is not predisposed to a result based on racial, religious, or
gender bias.446 The same rule holds true for judges. A litigant is
In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 12 (La. 12/13/04), 889 So. 2d 225, 233, 234.
See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015).
443 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 384 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968).
444 Compare Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1665 (applying strict scrutiny where a candidate
for judicial office challenges First Amendment violations), with Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)) (applying a specialized standard of review, “the
Connick test” for other government employees).
445 See e.g., Mark Berman, Hate Crimes in the United States Increased Last Year, the FBI
Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017
/11/13/hate-crimes-in-the-united-states-increased-last-year-the-fbi-says/?utm_term=
.1e61356a370a; Sam Petulla et al., The Number of Hate Crimes Rose in 2016, CNN (Nov. 13,
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/13/politics/hate-crimes-fbi-2016-rise/index.html. In terms
of crimes against religious minorities, there has been a rise of crimes against Muslims in the
United States since the election. See e.g., Katayoun Kishi, Assaults Against Muslims in U.S.
Surpass 2001 Level, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.pewrese arch.org/facttank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/.
446 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986) (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316,
321 (1906); Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
441
442
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entitled to challenge a juror for cause as well as a judge.447 Some
jurisdictions extend the “appearance of impropriety” standard to
recusal.448 However, no rule of judicial ethics exists which takes into
account how a judge’s public or known private conduct might affect
the right to a fair trial by strengthening a community’s implicit
biases.449 One means to curtail this possibility is to make the removal
of judges who engage in sexist, racist, or other bigoted acts more
likely. Some states, such as Oregon, New York, and Washington have
taken a step in this direction.450 But, most of the state supreme
courts have not.451 And, while it appears that there is less tolerance
for sexism in the courts, and a few states have removed judicial
officers who refused to perform same-sex marriages,452 there remains
inequities in judicial discipline and tolerance for derogatory conduct
toward minority groups.453 In the end, assessing judicial misconduct
not only against the current standards of judicial canons of ethics,
but also by adding considerations of community harm will enable a
state judicial system to better protect the integrity of its judicial
system by instilling long-term public confidence and wider
participation in it.

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 2018).
See, e.g., Ex parte Bryant, 682 So. 2d 39, 41 (Ala. 1996); Tennant v. Marion Health Care
Found, 459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W. Va. 1995).
449 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3 (prohibiting judges from “manifesting
bias,” but does not discuss how judicial conduct may impact community biases).
450 See In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 121, 123 (N.Y. 2000); Inquiry Concerning a Judge
(Day), 413 P.3d 907, 959 (Or. 2018); In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 927, 943 (Wash. 1999).
451 See In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 13 (La. 12/13/04), 889 So. 2d 225, 234; Bob Egelko, Court
Commissioner Disciplined for Abusive Behavior Toward Interpreter, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Court-commissioner-disciplined-for-abusive12253514.php (describing a judge with a history of making sexist and racist comments who was
repeatedly disciplined but not removed from the bench).
452 See Pete Williams, Wyoming Judge Faces Removal for Refusing Same-Sex Marriages,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/wyoming-judge-facesremoval-refusing-same-sex-marriages-n632906; ‘Not Going to Miss the Ayatollah of Alabama’:
State’s Chief Justice Removed in Gay-Marriage Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/ct-alabama-justice-suspended-over-gay-marriagestance-20160930-story.html.
453 Compare In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 13, 889 So. 2d at 234 (finding one-year suspension,
with six months deffered if the Judge completed racial sensitivity training, adequate), with In
re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d at 123 (finding removal appropriate).
447
448

